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I. INTRODUCTION
For many people the fear of death is overshadowed by the fear of
the process of dying. Fear of the dying process, implicit in such cul-
tural shibboleths as the cowboy's preference to die "with his boots on,"
has been accentuated in late twentieth-century America. Medical "mir-
acles" can prolong the dying process in ways undreamed of by the cow-
boys of a century ago. Machines can substitute for vital organs that are
no longer functional; they can breathe for a person, cleanse the blood
of toxins, and pump blood through the body. Other machines can
restart a heart that has ceased functioning, or stimulate a dysfunc-
tional heart to function properly. Medical and surgical procedures can
provide nutrition and hydration to persons unable to swallow and re-
move waste products from a body unable to do so naturally.
[Vol. 42
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Patients generally desire to use these "miracles" to restore health
or to continue a cognitive and functional life. Many people, however,
express the desire that procedures such as these not be administered
when the procedures mar the life that they prolong with chronic pain
or strip it of certain attributes normally associated with human exis-
tence, such as cognition, mobility, or the ability to interact with friends
or family. For many people, "'[tihe ultimate horror is not death but
the possibility of being maintained in limbo, in a sterile room, by ma-
chines controlled by strangers.' ,,
This view became something of a "movement" after the 1976 case
of Karen Quinlan2 publicized the idea that prolonging life under such
circumstances might be considered a mandate of law or medical ethics.
Since that time, a number of persons have filed lawsuits seeking to
withdraw life-sustaining procedures either from themselves or from in-
competent patients for whom they are responsible. Countless persons
have executed documents stating their desire that life-sustaining pro-
cedures not be administered to them. Most states have enacted stat-
utes that expressly authorize the withdrawal or withholding of life-sus-
taining procedures under certain circumstances.
Publid interest in the "right to die" issue surged after the June
1990 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Missouri Department of Health.3 In this case the parents of a
young woman who had been in a persistent vegetative state' for seven
years sought removal of the gastrostomy tube5 that was sustaining her
life. The Missouri Supreme Court denied the request, holding that life-
sustaining treatment could not be Withheld at the request of a surro-
gate in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of the patient's
own desires. 6 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that
Missouri's requirement did not violate the United States Constitution.
The Court recognized, however, that the liberties protected by the Due
Process Clauses of the Constitution encompass the right of a patient to
1. Steel, The Right to Die: New Options in California, 93 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 996
(1976) (quoting California Assemblyman Barry Keene).
2. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1977). The New Jersey Supreme Court refined its views in In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,
486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
3. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
4. A persistent vegetative state is a chronic and irreversible condition in which the
patient lacks interaction with the environment, awareness of pain or pleasure, and any
cognitive functioning. Cohen, Death and Dying, in BIOLAw R:247, 254 (1989).
5. A gastrostomy tube is surgically implanted into the stomach to provide nutri-
tion and hydration to the unconscious patient. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2845, 2856-57 (1990).
6. Id. at 2847.
7. Id. at 2854.
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refuse treatment, either contemporaneously or through an advance
directive."
One clear principle that emerged from the spate of judicial and
legislative activity that followed In re Quinlan, and was given new ur-
gency by Cruzan, is the importance of knowing the desires of the pa-
tient for whom nontreatment is being considered. Relying on the tort
doctrine of informed consent and on federal decisions that protect bod-
ily integrity, both federal and state courts uniformly have given effect
to patients' advance determinations that they do not wish to receive
certain health care. In the absence of evidence of the patient's wishes,
the outcome will depend on courts' and other surrogates' assessments
of factors such as the comparative benefits and burdens of treatment,
the likelihood that a person with the patient's attitudes and values
would or would not want treatment, and the strength of the state's
interest in preserving life in various circumstances.9 When the patient's
condition is neither terminal nor irreversibly unconscious, it is likely
that courts will require continuation of treatment. Cruzan demon-
strates that this may be the result even when the patient is perma-
nently unconscious. Persons who wish to avoid litigation or ensure non-
treatment, particularly in circumstances other than irreversible
unconsciousness or a terminal condition, should state their desires with
particularity while they are still competent to do so.
Although a number of courts have relied upon a patient's oral ex-
pressions to establish his wishes, oral expressions are problematic in a
number of ways. First, they are less trustworthy than written expres-
sions because of the potential for error or fabrication by those persons
reporting the statements. Furthermore, oral statements often do not
clearly establish what the patient's desires would have been in the par-
ticular situation at hand, because they tend to be general in content.
Finally, because of the informality of the circumstances in which per-
sons tend to make these statements, they may not represent a serious
and considered expression of the speaker's desires about his own future
care.10 For these reasons, a court may not treat oral statements as clear
and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes concerning termination
of treatment.1
8. Id. at 2853.
9. The courts will also consider the state's interest in preserving life, as well as
other state interests, when the patient's wishes are known. However, the likelihood that
the state's interest will be held to outweigh the patient's choice is minimal. See infra
notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
10. In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 530, 531 N.E.2d 607,
613, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 892 (1988); see Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo.
1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
11. This may be particularly true if the patient is a woman. A recent article that
[Vol. 42
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A written expression is more likely to receive adherence from
those responsible. for decisions about health care. Written instruments
for this purpose take two primary forms. The first form directs the
provider to provide or withhold certain types of care, as is the case
with a living will. The second form assigns to a named agent the power
to consent to or refuse health care, as in a durable power of attorney
for health care.
The existence of two different forms reflects, at least in part, the
difficulties in applying the informed consent model to advance plan-
ning for health care. The informed consent model assumes that a pa-
tient can make a reasoned decision concerning his care after being in-
formed of his condition, the alternative courses of action, and the risks
and benefits of each alternative. When the patient is incompetent,
however, decision making must follow one of two alternative models,
each of which is deficient when measured against the informed consent
model of patient autonomy. The patient may make the decision in ad-
vance, but without knowledge of the specific circumstances in which he
will find himself or the precise options available. Alternatively, a fully
informed surrogate, ideally a person chosen by the patient, may make
a contemporaneous decision. The living will represents the first option;
the durable power of attorney represents the second.
A living will generally states that in the event the patient's condi-
tion is hopeless, treatment that merely postpones the moment of death
should not be provided. A living will can take many forms. An individ-
ual may write a living will in his own words, or he may use the statu-
tory living will form set forth in the South Carolina Code,12 or a form
distributed by a religious or advocacy group. Both statutory and non-
statutory forms of a living will can have a legal effect on the course of
treatment; hence both will be discussed.
A durable power of attorney for health care appoints an agent,
called an attorney-in-fact, with the power to make specified decisions
on the principal's behalf. The principal may define the authority of
surveyed judicial treatment of patients' expressions of intent found that appellate courts
tend to give minimal weight to female patients' expressions, adopting a protective stance
to prevent medical neglect of these patients. On the other hand, appellate courts tend to
view male patients as susceptible to medical assault rather than medical neglect and
perhaps read more into their statements than the patients intended. Miles & August,
Courts, Gender and "The Right to Die," 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 85 (1990). These
findings reinforce the need for clarity in recording the wishes of both male and female
clients. They suggest that a female must fully set forth the breadth of her desire for
withdrawal or withholding of treatment, whereas a male must explicitly state any limita-
tions on his desire for nontreatment.
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), as amended by R. 220, H.
3090 (1991).
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this agent in any way that he chooses and may include specific instruc-
tions on how the agent should treat certain situations. For example,
the principal might instruct the attorney-in-fact to refuse cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation if the principal's life expectancy is less than six
months, or to make treatment decisions according to his assessment of
the principal's best interests.
South Carolina and federal laws presently establish the legal foun-
dation for use of either the living will or durable power of attorney by
persons who wish to plan for their future health care. This Article will
discuss the use of each of these types of health care planning instru-
ment. Discussion of living wills will cover both the form of living will
set forth in the South Carolina Death With Dignity Act, as amended in
1991,13 and other forms. The use of durable powers of attorney will be
examined from the perspective of the 1990 amendments to the South
Carolina Probate Code14 and South Carolina's new Adult Health Care
Consent Act.15 Initially, the nature, legal status, and effect on health
care of each type of instrument will be discussed. Thereafter, informa-
tion on drafting, executing, and revoking each instrument will be
provided.
II. THE SOUTH CAROLINA DEATH WITH DIGNITY AcT
The South Carolina Death With Dignity Act (Act)16 establishes a
legislatively approved mechanism for directing that life-sustaining
treatment be withheld or withdrawn in the event of terminal illness or
permanent unconsciousness. The mechanism is a particular form of liv-
ing will called a "Declaration of a Desire for a Natural Death" 17 (Dec-
laration). The Declaration operates only in a specified set of circum-
stances, which may or may not coincide with the circumstances in
which a particular individual wishes to refuse treatment.18 Nonethe-
less, it is a valuable tool for planning future health care because it re-
quires health care providers to honor the patient's wishes and protects
them from liability.
13. Id. §§ 44-77-10 to -160.
14. 1990 S.C. Acts 521.
15. Id.
16. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), as amended by
R. 220, H. 3090 (1991).
17. See id. § 44-77-50.
18. For instance, a recent study found that 73% of the patients studied would want
certain forms of treatment withheld if they were severely demented. Emanuel, Barry,
Stoeckle, Ettelson & Emanuel, Advance Directives for Medical Care-A Case for
Greater Use, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 889, 892 (1991). The Declaration does not provide
for nontreatment in situations of dementia.
[Vol. 42
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A. Effect of a Declaration in Treatment Settings
The attorney for a person considering use of a Declaration should
make sure that the client fully understands the effect of the Declara-
tion on the future course of his medical care, and should encourage the
client to discuss the medical aspects of the document with his physi-
cian. It is important to ensure that the client actually wants the course
of care that the Declaration provides for, and to determine if the client
has additional wishes about nontreatment that should be expressed in
the Declaration 9 or in a separate instrument. 0
A Declaration instructs health care providers to withhold or with-
draw life-sustaining procedures from a patient whose condition is ter-
minal or who is permanently unconscious.2 The declarant may choose
from alternative statements indicating whether artificial nutrition and
hydration are to be considered life-sustaining procedures that may be
withheld or withdrawn.
1. Terminal Conditions
A condition is "terminal" for purposes of the Act if it is "incurable
or irreversible" and "within reasonable medical judgment, could cause
death within a reasonably short period of time if life-sustaining proce-
dures are not used."22 Life-sustaining procedures include any form of
medical intervention that serves "only to prolong the dying process
and where, in the judgment of the attending physician, death will oc-
cur whether or not the procedures are utilized."'" Therefore, a Declara-
tion instructs a provider to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining pro-
cedure if: (1) the patient suffers from an incurable or irreversible
condition; (2) this condition could cause death within a reasonably
short time if the procedure is not used; (3) use of the procedure will
postpone, but not prevent, death; and (4) the patient's condition dur-
ing the added time can reasonably be characterized as "the dying pro-
cess." For example, a patient whose only affliction is pneumonia is not
suffering from a terminal condition, because pneumonia is not incur-
able or irreversible, and the proffered antibiotic treatment does more
19. See infra note 173 (effect of supplemental instructions within the declaration
itself).
20. A separate instrument could be either a nonstatutory living will, see infra notes
46-93 and accompanying text, or a durable power of attorney, see infra notes 94-143 and
accompanying text.
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), as amended by R. 220, H.
3090 (1991).
22. Id. § 44-77-20(4).
23. Id. § 44-77-20(2).
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than merely prolong the dying process.
The wording of the definition of "terminal condition" is changed
by the 1991 amendments. The amended definition uses more flexible
language in recognition of the uncertainties of medical prognosis. The
only change that may be of substantive significance is the substitution
of the word "could" for "will" in the phrase "could cause death within
a reasonably short period of time." Read literally, this change would
significantly broaden the class of conditions that could be considered
terminal: an irreversible condition that presents a one percent possibil-
ity of impending death would satisfy the statutory standard. This in-
terpretation, however, is contrary to the intent of the legislators, to
medical and societal ethics, and to the intent of persons who execute
declarations. The word "could" here should be read as merely an ac-
knowledgement of medical uncertainty.24 Rather than demanding that
the physician be certain that the condition will cause death within a
short time, the statute merely requires the exercise of reasonable medi-
cal judgment and a probability, rather than a certainty, of near-term
death.
2. Long-Term Chronic Conditions
If the patient who contracted pneumonia was already suffering
from a long-term chronic condition such as Alzheimer's disease, the
analysis would be somewhat different. Alzheimer's disease is an irre-
versible and incurable condition; however, Alzheimer's disease will not
necessarily cause the patient's death within a relatively short time.
25 If
the physician can determine that the patient is in the final stage of the
disease 26 and "could" die within a reasonably short time regardless of
24. The language of the definition was changed at a meeting of the General Laws
Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, which the author attended. The dis-
cussion regarding this change focused on accommodating the law to the realities of medi-
cal practice and providing physicians with appropriate protections from liability. The
amendment to the definition of terminal condition was approved in conjunction with an
amendment to immunize from liability a physician who in good faith certifies that a
patient's condition is terminal. Id. § 44-77-90.
25. It is not certain that Alzheimer's disease can cause death, though it often is
assumed that it can. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, LOSING A MIL-
LION MINDS: CONFRONTING THE TRAGEDY OF ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE AND OTHER DEMENTIAS
14 (1937) [hereinafter ALZHEIMER'S REPORT]. Patients with Alzheimer's disease generally
die of some other illness. Id. at 14-15.
The average duration of Alzheimer's disease is eight years. Id. at 14. However, the
duration of the disease can be as long as 25 years. Id. During a significant portion of this
time the patient is likely to be incompetent in some or all areas of decision making. Id.
at 13-16, 62-67, 68-79, 149-50.
26. See, e.g., id. at 62-67; Reisberg, Ferris & Franssen, An Ordinal Functional As-
[Vol. 42
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the pneumonia, the Act considers the patient's condition terminal. An-
tibiotic therapy could prevent the pneumonia from causing death, but
would not affect the patient's impending death from Alzheimer's-re-
lated disease. In the interval between cure of the pneumonia and death
from Alzheimer's disease, the patient would be immobile and pro-
foundly demented; hence, extension of this patient's life reasonably
could be characterized as merely a prolongation of the dying process,
and the provision of antibiotics consequently would be a life-sustaining
procedure that could be withheld under the Act.
If, on the other hand, the patient, though severely demented, was
in an earlier stage of Alzheimer's, and an Alzheimer's-related death
could not reliably be foreseen within a relatively short period of time,
the patient's condition would not be terminal as defined by the Act.
Therefore, providers could not withhold antibiotic therapy pursuant to
the Declaration. For the patient's condition to be considered terminal,
the impending death must be causally linked to an irreversible condi-
tion. Alzheimer's disease is irreversible, but will not cause death for
this patient within a short period of time. Pneumonia could cause im-
minent death, but it is reversible. Hence, a Declaration would not au-
thorize providers to withhold treatment from this patient.
3. Permanently Unconscious Patients
The 1991 amendments to the Death With Dignity Act added "per-
manent unconsciousness" as a second condition in which life-sus-
taining procedures could be withheld or withdrawn from a declarant.
27
Permanent unconsciousness is defined to include a persistent vegeta-
tive state or other irreversible condition in which the person has no
upper brain function, but only the involuntary vegetative or primitive
reflex functions controlled by the brain stem 28 A diagnosis of perma-
nent unconsciousness may not be certified for purposes of the Act until
the patient has remained unconscious for ninety days, unless the pa-
tient's condition is such that the diagnosis can be made with a high
degree of medical certainty without ninety days of observation. 29
sessment Tool for Alzheimer's-Type Dementia, 6 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 593
(1985) (description of the stages of Alzheimer's disease).
27. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), as amended by R. 220, H.
3090 (1991).
28. Id. § 44-77-20(7). For a discussion of medical conditions that are associated
with permanent unconsciousness, see Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The
Medical Reality (Getting the Facts Straight), HASTINGS CENTER RaP., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at
27.
29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), as amended by R. 220 H.
3090 (1991).
1991]
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The language of the Act retains some ambiguity concerning what
procedures may be withheld or withdrawn from a permanently uncon-
scious person. However, any ambiguity is easily resolved by referring to
the legislative intent as embodied in the statute itself. Life-sustaining
procedures, which may be withheld or withdrawn, are defined as medi-
cal interventions that "would serve only to prolong the dying process,"
where "death will occur whether or not the procedures are utilized."
Because permanent unconsciousness may be of extended duration,30 it
might be argued that a permanently unconscious patient is not in the
process of dying. The legislature, however, made the judgment that
permanent unconsciousness is a form of the "dying process" when it
designated permanent unconsciousness as a condition in which life-sus-
taining procedures, and specifically nutrition and hydration, 31 may be
withheld or withdrawn. Whereas a person with a terminal condition is
in the process of dying in a temporal sense, a person who is perma-
nently unconscious is in the process of dying in a qualitative sense.
Therefore, a medical intervention that will merely prolong a state of
permanent unconsciousness is a life-sustaining procedure.
4. Nutrition and Hydration
A person executing a declaration has a choice of whether or not he
wants to receive artificial nutrition and hydration. The declarant indi-
cates by initialing applicable statements on the Declaration form
whether he wants artificial nutrition and hydration if his condition is
terminal and whether he wants such procedures if he is permanently
unconscious.
32
If the declarant has not initialed an applicable statement, nutri-
tion and hydration necessary for comfort care or alleviation of pain will
be provided.3 3 Under pre-1991 law, nutrition and hydration for comfort
30. Cranford, supra note 28, at 31 (it is not uncommon for patients to survive in
this condition from five to twenty years).
31. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-20(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), as amended by R.
220, H. 3090 (1991).
32. Id. §§ 44-77-20(2), -50.
33. Id. § 44-77-20(2). The language of the applicable provision reads: "Pursuant to
a lawfully executed declaration if the declarant fails to give instructions by initialing the
appropriate statements concerning nutrition and hydration, nutrition and hydration nec-
essary for comfort care or alleviation of pain will be provided." The introductory clause
was added to indicate that the provision was referring only to the effect of the Declara-
tion, and was not intended to prevent the withdrawal or withholding of artificial nutri-
tion and hydration pursuant to other sources of legal authority. See also id. § 44-77-140
("This chapter applies only to persons who have executed a declaration in accordance
with this chapter. Nothing in this chapter impairs any other legal right or legal responsi-
bility which a person may have to effect the withholding or withdrawal or the provision
[Vol. 42
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care or alleviation of pain was excluded from the definition of life-sus-
taining procedures; 4 withdrawal or withholding of nutrition and hy-
dration thus was not authorized by a Declaration so long as those pro-
cedures were necessary to the patient's comfort. The 1991 amendments
continue this approach when the declarant has not indicated a prefer-
ence for an alternative approach in the Declaration.
The "comfort care" approach might seem to impose a blanket pro-
hibition on withholding or withdrawal of nutrition and hydration, since
discomfort is normally associated with dehydration or starvation. It
may be possible, however, to avoid discomfort through the administra-
tion of appropriate medications.35 Moreover, in some circumstances the
patient may lack the capacity to experience pain. The most notable of
these conditions is permanent unconsciousness, in which the absence of
neocortical functioning prevents the patient from experiencing pain or
suffering.36 Thus, under the "comfort care" approach, nutrition and
hydration may be withdrawn from a declarant who will not experience
pain because of medication or neocortical dysfunction if the means for
providing nutrition and hydration constitutes a medical procedure
37
and the provision of nutrition and hydration merely prolongs the dying
process.
of life-sustaining procedures in any lawful manner.").
34. Id. § 44-77-20(2).
35. Cf. In re Estate of Greenspan, 137 II. 2d 1, 4, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1196 (1990)
(noting that "[a]nalgesics could be given to relieve any pain associated with withdrawal
of the feeding tube").
36. See American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs and Council on
Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Persistent Vegetative State and the Decision to Withdraw or
Withhold Life Support, 263 J. A.MA 426, 428 (1990) [hereinafter AMA Council Report];
Cranford, supra note 28, at 27, 31. Cranford quotes from the amicus curiae brief filed by
the American Academy of Neurology in Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass.
417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986):
No conscious experience of pain and suffering is possible without the inte-
grated functioning of the brain stem and cerebral cortex. Pain and suffering
are attributes of consciousness, and PVS patients like Brophy do not experi-
ence them. Noxious stimuli may activate peripherally located nerves, but only
a brain with the capacity for consciousness can translate that neural activity
into an experience. That part of Brophy's brain is forever lost.
Cranford, supra note 28, at 31.
37. Provision of nutrition and hydration through a surgically implanted gastros-
tomy tube, a nasogastric tube, or other medically implanted mechanism repeatedly has
been held to be a medical procedure. E.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 586-87
(D.R.I. 1988); In re Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); see also
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2857 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 372-74, 486 A.2d 1209, 1235-36 (1985). This con-
ceptualization is also apparent in the 1991 amendments to the Death With Dignity Act.
1991]
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B. Procedures for Implementation
Before effectuating a Declaration, the health care provider must
determine its validity, as the duties and immunities created by the Act
apply only when the provider is presented with a valid Declaration.
However, the Act does not require the provider to go beyond the face
of the Declaration to determine its validity." Thus, a provider can de-
termine validity by comparing the patient's Declaration with the statu-
tory model, and checking to see that (1) the document has been signed
and dated by the patient, (2) the affidavit has been signed by two wit-
nesses, and (3) the notary's statement has been completed, signed, and
sealed. The physician is not required to conduct an inquiry into the
qualifications of the witnesses or the circumstances under which the
Declaration was signed.39
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-90 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). One of the objectives of
the 1988 amendments to the Act was to limit a provider's duty to ensure the validity of
the Declaration. The 1988 amendments to the Death With Dignity Act were drafted by
an ad hoc committee of the Probate Section of the South Carolina Bar. The language
proposed by that committee, which was chaired by the author, was enacted virtually
without change. The comment to § 7 of that proposal (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-
77-90 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990)) states that a purpose of the amendments was
to clarify that a physician or other health care provider called upon to imple-
ment a declaration is not responsible for confirming that the witnesses are
qualified, that an ombudsman witness has signed where necessary, whether the
witnesses signed in the presence of the declarant and of each other, or any
other requirements pertaining to execution of the declaration that do not ap-
pear on the face of the document itself.
AD Hoc COMMITrEE, PROBATE SECTION op S.C. BAR, PROPOSED ACT TO AMEND THE ACT TO
AUTHORIZE AN ADULT TO MAKE A WRITTEN DIRECTIVE INSTRUCTING His PHYSICIAN TO
WITHHOLD OR WITHDRAW LIFE-SUSTAINING PROCEDURES IN THE EVENT OF A TERMINAL
CONDITION 28 (1988) (hereinafter Probate Section Proposal]. It was intended that the
provider's duty to assure the validity of the Declaration be satisfied by an examination of
the face of the document and the patient's medical record.
Although the physician or hospital may seek a legal opinion, they usually should be
able to make the determination of validity without legal advice. If a Declaration contains
substantive or potentially substantive deviations from the statutory form, however, legal
advice will be necessary to determine the applicability of the statute or common-law
principles. Therefore, those who draft Declarations should be careful to avoid such devi-
ations unless they are necessary to express the intent of the declarant.
39. Similarly, a revocation binds the physician only if he has actual notice of it.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-80(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), as amended by R. 220, H. 3090
(1991) (the various forms of revocation are effective only when communicated to the
attending physician); id. § 44-77-90 (a person may rely upon a Declaration unless he has
actual notice of revocation). The provider is not required to make inquiry of an agent
who has been given power to revoke, or otherwise investigate whether a revocation has
taken place.
It is uncertain whether actual notice exists when an attending physician discovers in
the patient's medical record a notation made by another physician documenting the lat-
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In addition to determining the validity of the Declaration, the pro-
vider must certify that the declarant's condition is terminal 0 or that
the declarant is permanently unconscious before giving effect to the
Declaration. Two physicians, one of whom is the attending physician,
must personally examine the declarant to confirm the diagnosis.
41
After the certification of terminal condition or permanent uncon-
sciousness is made, the declarant must receive at least six hours of ac-
tive treatment before the Declaration may be given effect.' Active
treatment is defined as the standard of care that would be adminis-
tered to the declarant if he had not executed the Declaration 3 and life-
sustaining procedures were not going to be withheld or withdrawn
within a short time. The purpose of the "active treatment" provision
seemingly is to allow for more certainty in the diagnosis by requiring
providers to observe the patient and his response to treatment for six
hours after the terminal condition or permanent unconsciousness ini-
tially is diagnosed.
If the Declaration is valid, no notice of revocation has been re-
ceived, the patient's condition has been certified by two physicians,
and active treatment has been provided for at least six hours, then the
physician and hospital have a duty to see that the Declaration is given
effect. They do not, however, have a duty to effectuate it themselves.
Rather, they may either effectuate it, or "make a reasonable effort to
locate a physician or health care facility that will effectuate the decla-
ration and. . . transfer the patient to that physician or facility.""4 It is
unclear whether the unwilling physician or hospital has any further
duty to the declarant if the reasonable search falls to locate a physician
or hospital willing to carry out the Declaration. The language of the
Act does not explicitly impose any such duty; however, the few cases
that have addressed this issue indicate that a duty may exist to effec-
tuate the Declaration if for some reason the patient cannot or should
ter's receipt of notice of revocation pursuant to § 44-77-80. Although the revocation may
not have been communicated directly to him, if it was communicated to a prior attend-
ing physician in the manner required by § 44-77-80, the notation should be construed as
actual notice to the subsequent attending physician.
40. For discussion of the meaning of "terminal condition" under the Act, see supra
notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), as amended by R. 220, H.
3090 (1991).
42. Id. 44-77-30(2).
43. Id. § 44-77-20(5).
44. Id. § 44-77-100. The 1991 amendments added an analogous "conscience clause"
for nurses and other hospital employees. If notified of the employee's objection to partic-
ipating in the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures, a hospital or phy-
sician must make a reasonable effort to effectuate the Declaration without the em-
ployee's participation. Id.
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not be transferred.45
III. NONSTATUTORY INSTRUCTIONS
Because of the lack of flexibility in the statutory living will, some
persons prefer to leave nonstatutory instructions concerning life-sus-
taining treatment. These instructions may be given in the form of a
nonstatutory living will or as an addendum to a statutory living will. A
nonstatutory living will is a living will that does not conform to the
Declaration form in the South Carolina Death With Dignity Act.4" This
includes form living wills distributed by religious or other organiza-
tions, as well as statements composed by the individual. Although non-
45. Elbaum v. Grace Place of Great Neck, Inc., 148 A.D.2d 244, 256, 544 N.Y.S.2d
840, 848 (1989); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 590-91 (D.R.I. 1988); In re Jobes, 108
N.J. 394, 425-26, 529 A.2d 434, 450 (1987); In re Requena, 213 N.J. Super. 475, 487-88,
517 A.2d 886, 893 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd per curiam, 213 N.J. Super. 443, 517 A.2d
869 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986). But cf. In re Morrison, 206 Cal. App. 3d 304, 310-12, 253
Cal. Rptr. 530, 534-35 (Ct. App. 1988) (physician should not be forced to act against
personal moral beliefs if patient can be transferred to physician who will carry out deci-
sion, and in absence of efforts to transfer, the court will not decide whether patient's or
physician's rights would prevail if transfer were impossible); Brophy v. New England
Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 440-41 & n.39, 497 N.E.2d 626, 639 & n.39 (1986) (hospital
could not be compelled to violate policy against withholding nutrition and hydration
when the hospital policy would have no impact on patient's right of self-determination).
All of the above cases recognize the legitimacy of a provider's moral or ethical principles
precluding participation in the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. When the con-
flict between the provider's right to adhere to his ethical principles and the patient's
right to refuse treatment has been presented directly to the court, however, the court has
ruled in favor of the patient. In Requena the court ordered the objecting hospital to
carry out the patient's wishes despite the availability of a suitable alternative provider
when the evidence indicated that removal from the familiar facility and its personnel
would be psychologically harmful to the patient. Requena, 213 N.J. Super. at 480-81, 517
A.2d at 889.
In Elbaum, Morrison, and Jobes the court made a specific finding that the patient
was not given notice of the facility's policy at the time of admission, and an estoppel
theory seemed to guide the analysis. The Jobes court stated, "We do not decide the case
in which a nursing home gave notice of its policy. . . ." Jobes, 108 N.J. at 425, 529 A.2d
at 450. No court has yet considered a case in which the patient had either actual or
constructive notice of such a policy. It is hard to believe, however, that by entering a
facility with notice of its policy not to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment, a
patient would be deemed to give up control over such a fundamental aspect of his being.
This interpretation would be all the more unlikely if the patient had little choice among
facilities or if all facilities that offered needed care had similar policies. Cf. id. (noting
difficulty of finding an alternative facility that might accept the patient); Morrison, 206
Cal. App. 3d at 311, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 534 (plaintiff testified that she had tried and failed
to find nursing facilities that would take the patient under the circumstances).
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), as amended by R. 220, H.
3090 (1991).
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statutory instructions are incapable of invoking the duties and immu-
nities of the Act,47 they have practical and legal effects that make them
a desirable adjunct to, or substitute for, a statutory Declaration 'in
some circumstances.
A. Legal Basis for Nonstatutory Instructions
The legal significance of nonstatutory instructions derives from
the common law and constitutional right to refuse medical treatment.
The guiding principle in this area of law was forcefully stated by Jus-
tice (then Judge) Cardozo in 1914: "Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body .... 48 The South Carolina Court of Appeals in Hook v.
Rothstein expressly recognized this concept, which lies at the founda-
tion of the common-law requirements of consent and informed consent
to medical treatment. Control over one's body requires the right to re-
fuse treatment as a corollary to the right to consent. Thus, all cases
considering the issue since at least 1980 have recognized that a compe-
tent individual has the right to refuse unwanted care. 0 In Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health5 the Supreme Court recog-
nized that this right is protected by the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution.52
47. Cf. id. § 44-77-30.
48. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914), overruled on other grounds, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957),
quoted in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2847 (1990).
49. 281 S.C. 541, 547-48, 316 S.E.2d 690, 695 (Ct. App.) (recognizing "the patient's
right to exercise control over his or her own body by deciding intelligently for himself or
herself whether or not to submit to the particular procedure"), cert. denied, 283 S.C. 64,
320 S.E.2d 35 (1984).
50. Although earlier decisions often were limited to their facts and usually involved
the refusal of "extraordinary" treatment by terminally ill patients, see, e.g., Satz v. Perl-
mutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), af'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980),
the judicial language defining the right to refuse treatment has become broader and
more decisive as public and judicial opinion have jelled around the importance of medi-
cal self-determination. Recent cases emphasize that the right is not dependent upon the
type of treatment being refused or the gravity of the patient's condition. E.g., Tune v.
Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (D.D.C. 1985); Bouvia v.
Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (1986) (patient was
physically helpless, dependent on others for all of her needs, in continual pain, but had
life expectancy of 15 to 20 years).
51. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
52. The overwhelming majority of lower court cases that considered the issue prior
to Cruzan decided that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses the right to re-
fuse unwanted medical treatment. E.g., Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 585-86 (D.R.I.
1988); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739, 370
N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977). The Supreme Court recognized these holdings in Cruzan, but
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A patient does not lose the right to refuse treatment if incapacity
disables him from exercising it. 5 3 Rather, under the holdings of most
courts, a guardian or close relative may exercise the right on the pa-
tient's behalf.54 More importantly for present purposes, the Cruzan de-
cision and all state cases considering the issue have allowed a compe-
tent individual to exercise the right on behalf of his future
incompetent self.55 These courts have held that treatment should be
withheld when clear and convincing evidence exists that this is what
the incompetent patient would have desired.5 It is as evidence of the
incompetent patient's wishes that a nonstatutory living will has legal
effect, as the patient's written instructions concerning care will nor-
mally be accepted as clear and convincing evidence of his wishes. 7
There is no requirement that expressions of intent be in the statutory
form" or any other form.
The courts have not been oblivious to the possibility that recogni-
tion of treatment refusals in some circumstances might contravene
stated that "this issue is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest." 110 S. Ct. at 2851 n.7.
53. E.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 219, 741 P.2d 674, 686 (1987) (en
banc); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41-42, 355 A.2d 647, 664, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
54. E.g., In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 420, 529 A.2d 434, 446-47 (1987); In re Hamlin,
102 Wash. 2d 810, 818-20, 689 P.2d 1372, 1377 (1984). But see Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S.
Ct. 2841 (1990).
55. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
56. See, e.g., id. at 2847-52.
57. In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 16 (Fla. 1990); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 361, 486
A.2d 1209, 1229-30 (1985); In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517,
531, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613-14, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 892-93 (1988).
58. The statutory forms and procedures in South Carolina's Death With Dignity
Act are not the exclusive means for expressing and implementing a patient's intent to
refuse future treatment. Section 44-77-140 of that Act expressly preserves mechanisms
that might be available under the common law for accomplishing this purpose. That
section provides:
The absence of a declaration by an adult patient does not give rise to any
presumption as to his intent to consent to or refuse death-prolonging proce-
dures. Nothing in this chapter impairs any other legal right or legal responsi-
bility which any person may have to effect the withholding or withdrawal or
the provision of life-sustaining procedures in any lawful manner.
S.C. COD. ANN. § 44-77-140 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), as amended by R. 220, H. 3090
(1991). This language was intended to allow withholding and withdrawal of life-sus-
taining treatment pursuant to expressions of intent by the patient or a surrogate in a
form other than that expressly provided for in the statute, and similar language has been
so interpreted in other jurisdictions. E.g., In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 214-15,
245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 859-60, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988). The 1988 amendments
added the second sentence of § 44-77-140 to clarify the intent to preserve common-law
rights and remedies regarding refusal of treatment by or on behalf of the patient.
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public policy. They have enunciated four state interests that might be
disserved by withdrawing or withholding treatment at the direction of
a patient: protecting life, 9 third parties, 60 and the ethical integrity of
the medical profession,61 and preventing suicide.62 The state courts,
however, have rejected resoundingly the idea that the state has broad
interests capable of overriding a patient's interest in making the choice
to accept or reject health care.
6 3
59. The state's interest in preserving life encompasses both an interest in the life of
the particular patient and an interest in protecting the sanctity of life within our society.
E.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 349, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985). This interest is weak
when the patient suffers from a condition that significantly impairs the quality of his or
her remaining life, even if that life span is likely to be lengthy. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Supe-
rior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1142-44, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304-05 (1986). A fre-
quently quoted passage from Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977), demonstrates the courts' viewpoint:
The constitutional right to privacy, as we conceive it, is an expression of the
sanctity of individual free choice and self-determination as fundamental con-
stituents of life. The value of life as so perceived is lessened not by a decision
to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent human being the
right of choice.
Id. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
60. The interest in protecting third parties can refer to protection of the public
health, see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (refusal of vaccination), or to
protection of the emotional or financial interests of the patient's children or other depen-
dents, see In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). It has never been used, however, as the
basis for overriding a refusal of life-sustaining, as opposed to life-saving, treatment. The
patients in these cases are not generally in a position to provide either emotional or
financial benefits to their children, and in fact, the opposite may be the case. See, e.g., In
re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 352-53, 529 A.2d 404, 412-13 (1987).
61. The interest in protecting the ethical integrity of the medical profession is gen-
erally given short shrift because current precepts of medical ethics do not require provi-
sion of life-sustaining treatment to incompetents under all circumstances. See, e.g., Ras-
mussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 217, 741 P.2d 674, 684 (1987) (quoting Opinion of the
American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (March 15, 1986)).
Further, recent cases have stated that this interest is not capable of outweighing the
patient's interest in self-determination. E.g., Elbaum v. Grace Plaza of Great Neck, 148
A.D.2d 244, 256, 544 N.Y.S.2d 840, 847 (1989).
62. The courts uniformly have held that refusal of life-sustaining treatment does
not constitute suicide. They draw a distinction between affirmative action which inten-
tionally and directly causes death, and the withholding of medical intervention, which
allows the underlying disease to cause death. E.g., Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical
Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 n.8 (D.D.C. 1985); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.
App. 3d 1127, 1144-45, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (1986); In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 349-50,
529 A.2d 404, 411 (1987). But see Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct.
2841, 2859-63 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
63. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (1990);
In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 349-53, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223-25 (1985); Delio v. Westchester
County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 26, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 693 (1987); see also supra
note 50 and accompanying text.
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B. Substance of the Nonstatutory Living Will
Although a written expression of intent will be given great weight
in determining the appropriateness of any form of nontreatment, its
effect will depend upon the substance of the instructions. In order to
ensure that the instructions will be given determinative weight, the ex-
pression must clearly indicate that the declarant desires nontreatment
in the specific situation at issue. Lack of specificity in the patient's
instructions has been the basis for refusing to discontinue treatment in
several cases involving both oral and written statements.6 4 In In re
The Supreme Court in Cruzan recognized the importance of the state interest in
protection and preservation of human life, stating: "We do not think a State is required
to remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary decision by a physically-able
adult to starve to death." 110 S. Ct. at 2852. A complete reading of the opinions in the
case, however, supports the inference that all members of the majority except Justice
Scalia, see id. at 2859-63 (Scalia, J., concurring), believe that the state may indeed be
required to remain neutral when the patient who refuses nutrition and hydration suffers
from eevere physical and mental disabilities and provision of nutrition and hydration
requires medical intervention. In any event, the Supreme Court's view of the legitimacy
and weight of the state's interest becomes relevant only when the state uses that interest
to override the patient's decision.
Some courts have allowed state interests to override the patient's wishes in limited
situations. The state's interest in protecting the patient's dependent children has been
found strong enough to outweigh the patient's interest in bodily autonomy in a few cases
involving the refusal of treatment capable of restoring the patient to a normal life. E.g.,
In re President, 331 F.2d at 1008. Other courts have stated that this might be a basis for
overriding the patient's choice. E.g., Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 218, 741 P.2d at 685; Con-
roy, 98 N.J. at 353, 486 A.2d at 1225; Delio, 129 A.D.2d at 25, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 693. This
interest would not be a factor, however, in most situations in which an individual would
want to direct nontreatment by a living will, because in those situations the patient
would be incapable of contributing to the economic or emotional well-being of the chil-
dren because of severe disability. Indeed, it generally is recognized that caring for a fam-
ily member in a persistent vegetative state or a condition with severe and irreversible
dementia extracts both an emotional and a financial toll from the family. See, e.g., Grau,
Social Stress and Family Care of the Elderly, in ALZHEIMER's DISEASE AND RELATED
DIsoRDRS 175 (1988); Brody, Caring for Chronically Ill Heavy Burden for Well Family
Members, The State, Feb. 28, 1989, at 5-B, col. 1.
64. See, e.g., In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 526-27,
532-34, 531 N.E.2d 607, 610-11, 614-15, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 889-90, 893-94 (1988) (patient
stated that if ill, she "would never want to be a burden on anyone" or lose her dignity,
and "nature should take its course," "artificial means" should not be used and that she
would not want to go on living if she could not "take care of herself and make her own
decisions"); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411, 424 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (patient stated that if
sick or injured she would not want to continue her life if she could not live "halfway
normally"); see also Conroy, 98 N.J. at 362-64 & n.7, 486 A.2d at 1230-31 & n.7 (evidence
of the patient's lifelong fear of doctors, and her refusal to consult them even when af-
flicted with pneumonia, was inadequate to establish that she would have refused nutri-
tion and hydration in circumstances presented). But see In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947,
[Vol. 42
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss3/2
LNG WLLS AND DURABLE POWERS
Westchester County Medical Center," for instance, the patient had
made oral statements that she would not want to go on living if she
could not "take care of herself and make her own decisions," that she
"would never want any sort of intervention any sort of life support
systems to maintain or prolong her life," and that it was "monstrous"
to keep someone alive by using "'machinery, things like that' when
they are 'not going to get better.'" The patient subsequently became
afflicted with severe dementia resulting from multiple strokes, though
she was not in a coma or vegetative state.66 The court held that it was
not sufficiently clear from the statements in evidence that she would
want to decline artificial feeding through a nasogastric tube under the
circumstances, and authorized the hospital to insert the tube.
6 7
In another case, the patient executed a living will that called for
termination of life-sustaining treatment, including nutrition and hy-
dration, if death were "imminent.' 6 The patient suffered a stroke that
left her almost totally paralyzed, unable to swallow, and with major
irreversible brain damage. She received nourishment through a naso-
gastric tube. The court determined that death was not imminent, be-
cause the patient could live for an indefinite period so long as the gas-
trostomy tube was in place, and therefore the patient's refusal did not
apply because it was conditioned on the imminence of death.
6 9
Some circulated "living wills" contain the kind of imprecise lan-
guage from which such cases arise: "heroic measures," "artificial
953 (Me. 1987) (patient stated that he "would definitely want to die if he was ever in a
vegetable state," that people kept alive only by life-sustaining procedures lose their dig-
nity, and that "he would want to die" rather than be maintained in that condition);
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 429 n.22, 497 N.E.2d 626, 632 n.22
(1986) (patient stated that "I don't ever want to be on a life support system. No way do I
want to live like that; that is not living," that "[i]f I'm ever like [a severely burned
person he helped rescue from a burning truck], just shoot me, pull the plug," and that
"[i]f I can't sit up to kiss one of my beautiful daughters, I may as well be six feet
under.").
65. 72 N.Y.2d 517, 526-27, 531 N.E.2d 607, 611, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 890 (1988).
66. The patient, though conscious, was severely demented. Her daughters testified
that since her hospitalization, the patient never spoke or responded to them in any way,
even by facial expression or hand movement. The treating physicians testified that she
was capable of responding to simple questions with sounds or words such as "ok" or "all
right," though they were uncertain whether she understood the questions asked. Id. at
524-25, 544, 531 N.E.2d at 609-10, 621-22, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 888-89, 901.
67. Id. at 532-35, 531 N.E.2d at 614-16, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893-95.
68. In re Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), certified ques-
tion approved in 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
69. Id. at 265 (The court was applying a statutory definition of "terminal condi-
tion" that was conditioned upon the imminence of death.). The court held, however, that
under new guidelines set out in the case, the guardian could authorize withdrawal of the
tube under the right to privacy in the Florida constitution.
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means," "extraordinary treatment," "treatment that does not offer a
reasonable hope of benefit," or "terminally ill. ''7 To the extent possi-
ble, nonstatutory living wills should avoid this type of general phrase-
ology, and be as precise as possible about the types of treatment one
wishes to refuse and the circumstances in which one wishes to do so.
In planning for the wide variety of treatment choices with which
one might be presented in the future, it is necessary to draft a docu-
ment that will be sufficiently specific to apply to conditions that actu-
ally occur, yet sufficiently general to take into consideration a broad
range of potential conditions. It is impossible, of course, for the drafter
to anticipate and address every possible scenario. The best course of
action is to address specifically the most common conditions in which
patients or their families might wish to have treatment withheld or
withdrawn, and the most common forms of undesired treatment. The
drafter should supplement these specific provisions with others
describing more generally the categories of condition and treatment to
which the patient wishes the refusal to apply. To make the patient's
wishes as clear as possible, the document might spell out situations in
which the patient does want treatment as well as those in which he
does not want treatment.
A living will should specifically address whether the patient wants
treatment if he is permanently unconsciousness or suffering from a ter-
minal condition. If the patient desires nontreatment in case of a termi-
nal condition, the document should explain what is meant by terminal
condition. If the patient wants treatment withheld in the event of se-
vere dementia short of permanent unconsciousness, the document
should provide a particularized description of the circumstances to
which these instructions apply. When the patient is not terminally ill
or permanently unconscious a court is particularly likely to require
treatment in the absence of clear evidence that this is contrary to the
patient's wishes.
71
The patients in In re Westchester County Medical Center and In
re Conroy illustrate the conditions that would be reached only by spe-
cific instructions of the latter sort.7 2 Each patient was bedridden. Al-
though conscious, each suffered from severe and irreversible dementia
70. See, e.g., Eisendrath & Jonsen, The Living Will: Help or Hindrance, 249 J.
A.M.A. 2054, 2055 (1983) (setting forth text of living will circulated by Concern for Dy-
ing); CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS'N, CHRISTIAN AFFIRIATION OF LIFE: A STATEMENT ON TERMI-
NAL ILLNESS (1982).
71. See, e.g., In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,
486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531
N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988).
72. Westchester County, 72 N.Y.2d at 525, 544, 531 N.E.2d at 609, 622, 534
N.Y.S.2d at 888, 901; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 337, 486 A.2d at 1217.
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that profoundly restricted awareness of and ability to interact with the
environment. The patient in Westchester County was somewhat more
interactive, having the ability to state her name and say a few words
such as "ok" and "fine." She responded to questions, though not neces-
sarily appropriately, about fifty percent of the time, but her physicians
were not certain that she understood the questions. Despite frequent
visits from her two daughters, she had not spoken or responded to
them in any way, even by facial expression or hand movement." The
patient's dementia in Conroy was even more profound. The most that
could be said of her mental state and capacity for interaction was that
her eyes followed people around the room, her facial expressions were
different when she was awake and asleep, and she sometimes smiled
when her hair was combed or when she received a comforting rub. She
was unable to speak, and her physician believed she was unable to re-
spond to verbal stimuli.
74
As these cases illustrate, dementia can occur in different degrees
and with different characteristics.75 It is important, therefore, to de-
scribe those characteristics of dementia that would give rise to the pa-
tient's desire to refuse treatment. Some of the characteristics that
might be mentioned include loss of the ability to recognize family
members, loss of mobility, loss of multiple sensory functions, and loss
of ability to understand, engage in, or respond to verbal communica-
tions. The inability to swallow might also be included because this con-
dition not only creates a substantial dependence on medical technology
and a concurrent loss of mobility, but also tends to be associated with
the more serious levels of brain damage. 8 The characteristics noted are
exemplary only; the patient must give careful consideration to her own
values and beliefs concerning the attributes of a meaningful life, and
the language of the living will must be carefully tailored to capture
those values and beliefs.
77
The patient may also wish to specify the means by which his con-
dition and prognosis are to be determined. For instance, he may want
to specify the number or qualifications of the physicians who are em-
powered to make any medical determination that will cause the refusal
73. Westchester County, 72 N.Y.2d at 525, 544, 531 N.E.2d at 609, 622, 534
N.Y.S.2d at 888, 901.
74. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 337, 486 A.2d at 1217.
75. See, e.g., ALZHEIMER'S REFPORT, supra note 25, at 59-79.
76. Cranford, supra note 28, at 27.
77. Examples of personalized nonstatutory living wills are found in Modell, A
"Will" to Live, 290 NEW ENG. J. MED. 907, 908 (1974), and Cantor, My Annotated Living
Will, 18 LAv, MED. & HEALTH CARm 114, 115 (1990). See also the detailed decisionmaking
grid in Emanuel & Emanuel, The Medical Directive: A New Comprehensive Advance
Care Document, 261 J. A-MA. 3288, 3290 (1989).
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to become effective.
In addition to specifying the conditions under which one would
want treatment withheld and the procedures for determining whether
those conditions exist, the document should state which forms of treat-
ment should be withheld under each of the specified conditions. It is
particularly important to clearly state one's intentions concerning re-
suscitation, artificial nutrition and hydration, antibiotics for treatment
of infection, and other medications, as these have often been problem
areas in law and in medical practice.78 If the patient would desire pain
medication although it indirectly hastened death, this should also be
stated .7  One would normally refer to respirator therapy as well. Be-
cause the respirator has become the prototype of "life-sustaining ther-
apy" in the public mind, however, even vague statements of intent are
likely to be construed as a refusal of respirator therapy.
An attorney should advise the signatory of a living will of the im-
portance of periodically updating the signature, if not the content, of
the document. Health care providers, courts, and family members will
be more likely to treat the document as a legally effective expression of
the incompetent patient's intent if it was executed within a reasonable
time before the patient became incompetent.
C. Implementation of Nonstatutory Instructions
The South Carolina courts have not established legal guidelines
for the implementation of a nonstatutory living will. Thus, judicial in-
tervention may be necessary to effectuate a patient's intent that is ex-
pressed in such a document. The financial and emotional burden of
achieving implementation through the courts will normally fall on the
patient's family.80 Although this situation is not ideal, the costs of liti-
gation may be less than the costs of long-term care, making the imple-
78. See, e.g., Areen, Death and Dying, in I BIoLAw 289-93 (1988). One physician
included in a living will the following definition of "interventions" that should be with-
held: "all positive medical and surgical procedures and nursing procedures which would
tend to preserve my life, operations on the brain, intravenous feeding, blood transfu-
sions, tube feeding, implantation of radium, amputation, etc." Modell, supra note 77, at
908. A recent study indicated that large proportions of persons executing advance direc-
tives would want to refuse these procedures. Emanuel, Barry, Stoeckle, Ettelson &
Emanuel, Advance Directives for Medical Care-A Case for Greater Use, 324 NEw ENG.
J. MEDn, 889, 893 (1991).
79. In a recent study, almost 80% of the participants stated that they would want
to receive potentially life-shortening pain medications in some circumstances. Emanuel,
Barry, Stoeckle, Ettelson & Emanuel, supra note 78, at 893.
80. Although the judicial process is sometimes initiated by the provider, in judicial
proceedings a provider almost always advocates continued treatment, whether it is ap-
pearing as plaintiff or defendant.
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mentation of the living will the more cost-effective course of action
even when litigation is necessary. Furthermore, an attorney should
bear in mind that by the time implementation of a nonstatutory living
will becomes appropriate, new case law or statutory enactments may
have clarified the legal effectiveness of nonstatutory instructions in
South Carolina.8' Indeed, two developments within the past two years
have eliminated much uncertainty and made implementation without
judicial intervention more likely. First, the Cruzan decision affirmed
the constitutional stature of the patient's right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment through prior written instructions. Second, the South Caro-
lina legislature enacted the Adult Health Care Consent Act, which de-
nies to surrogates the authority to consent to health care contrary to
the known wishes of the patient.
8 2
Litigation generally has been the result of providers' uncertainty
about the legal or ethical consequences of implementing the patient's
instructions. Ethical uncertainties were diminished significantly by a
1986 policy statement on life-sustaining procedures issued by the
American Medical Association (AMA). This statement permits, but
does not require, physicians to participate in the implementation of
nontreatment decisions, stating:
For humane reasons, with informed consent, a physician may do what
is medically necessary to alleviate severe pain, or cease or omit treat-
ment to permit a terminally ill patient whose death is imminent to
die .... In deciding whether the administration of potentially life-
prolonging medical treatment is in the best interest of the patient who
is incompetent to act in his own behalf, the physician should deter-
81. Another option that has been used by at least one signatory of a living will is
an action for a declaratory judgment about the legal effect of the document. Significant
obstacles exist, however, to obtaining a declaratory judgment on the effect of a living
will. In particular, a court will entertain an action for declaratory judgment only if the
plaintiff demonstrates a "case or controversy." E.g., Power v. McNair, 255 S.C. 150, 177
S.E.2d 551 (1970). It may be difficult to convince a court that a case or controversy exists
if the plaintiff does not know whether he ever will experience a condition that would
invoke the living will, what that condition might be, what form of treatment might be
proffered, whether any person would object to implementation of the living will, and
what the identity of that person might be. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-53-10 to -
140 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (South Carolina Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act).
In the sole appellate case on point, the court accepted jurisdiction and declared that
the document was effective as "an informed medical consent statement" so that no fur-
ther judicial proceedings were necessary to discontinue medical treatment as specified in
the document. Saunders v. State, 129 Misc. 2d 45, 54-55, 492 N.Y.S.2d 510, 517 (Sup. Ct.
1985). The state, as defendant, raised the case or controversy issue. The court did not
address directly the problems noted above. Instead, it focused on the public importance
of the issue raised, the recurring nature of the issue, and the difficulties in obtaining
timely review. Id. at 48, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-60(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
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mine what the possibility is for extending life under humane and com-
fortable conditions and what are the prior expressed wishes of the pa-
tient and attitudes of the family or those who have responsibility for
the custody of the patient.
Even if death is not imminent but a patient's coma is beyond doubt
irreversible and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy
of the diagnosis and with the concurrence of those who have responsi-
bility for the care of the patient, it is not unethical to discontinue all
means of life prolonging medical treatment.
Life prolonging medical treatment includes medication and artificially
or technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration. In
treating a terminally ill or irreversibly comatose patient, the physician
should determine whether the benefits of treatment outweigh its bur-
dens. At all times, the dignity of the patient should be maintained."
The AMA position does not represent a mandate for physicians,
nor does it specify what type of consent the physician should rely on.
Furthermore, it does not address situations where the patient's condi-
tion is neither terminal nor permanently unconscious. Uncertainties re-
main, therefore, about how an individual physician will view his ethical
responsibilities. 4 The physician's willingness to effectuate instructions
will be affected by his personal values, his view of his obligations to the
patient, his sense of obligation to the patient's family, and his estima-
tion of the legal risk entailed in various courses of action.
The instructions themselves will influence the physician's view of
his obligations to the patient. Discussions with the patient about the
living will while the patient is still competent will give the physician a
greater assurance that he understands the patient's wishes. Regardless
of such an understanding, however, the physician may place his own
ethical views, such as his interpretation of the Hippocratic oath or his
religious beliefs, ahead of the patient's wishes. This possibility again
counsels in favor of the patient's discussing the living will with his
physician. If the physician feels constrained from carrying out the pa-
tient's instructions, the patient needs to know in advance so that he
can decide whether to continue his relationship with that physician.
Although a physician's ethical obligations normally run to the pa-
tient, many physicians feel an ethical obligation to the family of a dy-
ing patient.8 5 This sense of obligation merges with a fear that family
83. Statement of AMA Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs (March 15, 1986),
quoted in Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 217, 741 P.2d 674, 684 (1987).
84. Despite the prior issuance of the AMA statement, the American Academy of
Medical Ethics and various physicians filed amicus briefs in In re Estate of Greenspan,
137 I1. 2d 1, 5, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (1990), arguing that no clear medical consensus
supports the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration.
85. Zinberg, Decisions for the Dying: An Empirical Study of Physicians' Re-
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members may file a lawsuit if their wishes are not followed, a possibil-
ity that looms larger when compared with the irreversibly incompetent
patient's inability to litigate in support of his wishes. Thus, recent
studies of physicians' responses to living wills have found pervasive un-
willingness to effectuate a living will, whether statutory or nonstatu-
tory, if family members did not concur in that course of action. 8 To
ensure effectuation, therefore, it is imperative that the patient discuss
the living will with close family members and attempt to secure their
cooperation. The patient can obtain further assurance by executing a
durable power of attorney87 that names a sympathetic person as a sub-
stitute decision maker s or instructs that person to take the necessary
steps to enforce the living will.89
sponses to Advance Directives, 13 VT. L. REv. 445, 477-79 (1989).
86. Id. In a series of forums that the South Carolina Bar held with elderly persons
around the state, the participants frequently expressed the concern that family members
might prevent the implementation of a living will. The Hospital and Health Law Com-
mittee of the South Carolina Bar and the South Carolina Commission on Aging held the
four forums in July 1989 in various parts of the state. The forums were attended by
elderly persons and persons who work with the elderly. Their purpose was to elicit infor-
mation concerning problems that elderly patients have encountered in obtaining or re-
jecting treatment when they were incompetent to make treatment decisions on their
own. As a coordinator of this project, the author attended two of these forums. A written
summary and tape recordings of all four forums are on file at the offices of the South
Carolina Bar.
87. See infra notes 94-143 and accompanying text.
88. But see, e.g., In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 380, 529 A.2d 419, 427 (1987) (judicial
review of surrogate's decision is necessary when family members and guardian do not
agree on whether treatment should be provided, even when patient left instructions).
89. Under the 1991 amendments to the Death With Dignity Act, a declarant may
appoint an agent with authority to enforce a Declaration. A space for doing so is in-
cluded in the revised Declaration form. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-50 (Law. Co-op Supp.
1990), as amended by R. 220, H. 3090 (1991). This agent may petition the court of com-
mon pleas for an order directing providers to effectuate the Declaration. Id. § 44-77-85.
An attorney-in-fact or other surrogate might enforce a nonstatutory living will
through a similar action, see Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (action for
declaratory judgment), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S.
Ct. 2841 (1990); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713
(Super. Ct. 1984) (action for injunction), or an action for appointment of a guardian with
specific authority to refuse the unwanted treatment, see Delio v. Westchester County
Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1987). It may be possible to recover
attorneys' fees in such an action. See Gray v. Romeo, 709 F. Supp. 325 (D.R.I. 1988)
(action for declaratory judgment that failure to remove feeding tube was civil rights vio-
lation). Alternatively, the patient could authorize the surrogate to file an action for dam-
ages against providers refusing to implement the living will. For example, the South Car-
olina Death With Dignity Act creates a duty in physicians to comply with the living will,
breach of which could be the basis for a damage action. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-100
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). Furthermore, courts in several jurisdictions have recognized
common-law causes of action, though none has awarded damages. See generally Miller,
Right-to-Die Damage Actions: Developments in the Law, 65 DEN. U.L. REv. 181 (1988);
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Even if the family concurs with the instructions in the living will,
the physician may perceive that the legal risk of withholding or with-
drawing treatment is too great to permit him to proceed without judi-
cial approval. Family cooperation dramatically reduces the risk that a
lawsuit will be filed. When assessing the legal risk, however, the physi-
cian must consider not only the probability of a lawsuit, but also the
severity of the adverse effect if a lawsuit is filed. This requires the phy-
sician to consider the probability that he would be found liable and the
probability that public knowledge of the lawsuit would adversely affect
his reputation or practice.90 The decided cases suggest that the risk of
liability is low when the instructions for withholding treatment are
clearly applicable to the situation at hand and were executed within a
reasonable time before the patient became incompetent; the patient is
suffering from a terminal condition as defined in the Death With Dig-
nity Act or is in a state of permanent loss of cognition; and the treat-
ment would have no effect on the patient's terminal or noncognitive
condition.91 Furthermore, significant public support exists for non-
treatment in these circumstances, 92 and consequently damage to the
physician's reputation or practice is not likely. Ethical guidelines are
clear in these circumstances as well.9 Thus, it is most likely that phy-
sicians will be willing to implement the living will without resorting to
litigation when these criteria are satisfied.
The physician is less likely to implement instructions that relate
to other circumstances without judicial approval. The greater
probability of litigation, however, should not preclude the patient and
his attorney from addressing additional matters in the living will.
Rather, it suggests the importance of considering measures to assure
that judicial sanction will be obtained if necessary: for instance, appro-
priate discussions with family members, appointment of an attorney-
in-fact with power to ensure that his wishes are carried out, or an ac-
tion by the patient for a declaratory judgment on the legal effect of the
Civil Liability for Providing Unwanted Life Support, II BIOLAW § 12-4, at U:499 (Supp.
May/June 1987).
90. Fear of criminal prosecution for wrongfully ending a patient's life may also af-
fect the physician's attitude, even though the only relevant case soundly rejected the
application of homicide law to situations in which the physician, with family concurrence
and in accordance with professional standards, withholds life-sustaining treatment. Bar-
ber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). This fear is
particularly likely to be encountered among South Carolina physicians because of con-
cern generated by provisions of the original Death With Dignity Act that classified cer-
tain vaguely defined acts related to a Declaration as "murder." See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-
77-150 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986) (repealed by implication by 1988 S.C. Acts 586).
91. See supra notes 64-79 and accompanying text.
92. See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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living will.
IV. DURABLE POWERS OF ATrORNEY
A power of attorney is an instrument whereby a person appoints
someone else as his agent to act in a particular matter or class of mat-
ters.94 The durable power of attorney holds great promise for ex-
panding an individual's ability to influence future decisions concerning
his health care. A living will must anticipate the infirmities that the
declarant may experience in the future and indicate whether particular
types of care will be accepted or refused. Advance decision making of
this sort deviates from the ideal of informed consent, in which treat-
ment decisions are based on particularized information concerning the
patient's condition, the alternative courses of care that are available,
and the risks and benefits of each.9 5
Contemporaneous decision making by a carefully chosen agent
who possesses information about the patient's values and preferences,
the patient's condition, and available treatment alternatives, is viewed
by some commentators as a closer approximation of the informed con-
sent model.9s An individual who prefers this form of decision making
94. E.g., Peterson v. Peterson, 10 Kan. App. 2d 437, 442, 700 P.2d 585, 589 (1985);
F. COLLIN, J. LOMBARD, A. MOSES, & H. SPITLER, DRAFTING THE DURABLE POWER OF AT-
TORNEY: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 5 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter SYSTEMS APPROACH].
95. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1988), affd sub nom.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990); cf. Hook v. Rothstein,
281 S.C. 541, 547-48, 316 S.E.2d 690, 694-95 (Ct. App.), aff'd, 283 S.C. 64, 320 S.E.2d 35
(1984) (describing doctrine of informed consent).
96. See, e.g., Note, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 985, 1005 (1984); cf. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 136-37 (1983) (advance directive as imperfect instrument
for exercise of self-determination).
A durable power of attorney is preferable to a guardianship as a mechanism to ap-
point a substitute decisionmaker for several reasons. For example, delegation of health
care decisions to an attorney-in-fact provides greater assurance that the principal's
wishes about health care will be carried out. Furthermore, one of the original rationales
for the Durable Power of Attorney statutes was to avoid the cost and administrative
inconvenience of appointing a guardian or conservator. See SYSTEMS APPROACH, supra
note 94, at 6-8; Note, supra, at 1015 n.119; see generally UNIF. DURABLE POWER OF AT-
TORNEY ACT, Prefatory Note, 8A U.L.A. 275 (1983) (dominant idea underlying Uniform
Act was that durable powers would be alternatives to judicial protective proceedings). In
addition, procedures for appointment of a guardian normally involve delays that render
this mechanism impractical for some situations that require surrogate decision making
for health care. Finally, the use of a durable power is more private than proceedings for
appointment of a guardian, particularly now that the instrument need no longer be re-
corded. This distinction is important because of the highly personal facts involved in
competency proceedings and the effect on personal dignity of publication of these facts.
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can execute a durable power of attorney authorizing an agent to make
health care decisions and enunciating general or specific principles to
guide those decisions.
Although a power of attorney is a common-law instrument, the va-
lidity of a durable power of attorney is dependent upon a statutory
grant of authority. The common-law power of attorney is terminated or
suspended when the principal becomes disabled and is therefore una-
ble to supervise the agent's activities.91 Because periods of disability
constitute the very time when many persons wish to have an agent au-
thorized to act on their behalf, all states, including South Carolina,
have enacted statutes that authorize the creation of a power of attor-
ney that remains effective during the principal's disability.98 Because
of its capacity to endure beyond the traditional condition of termina-
tion or suspension, this instrument is called a durable power of attor-
ney. An alternative form of durable power of attorney, sometimes
called a springing durable power of attorney, does not become effective
until the disability of the principal." The South Carolina Legislature
amended the probate code in 1990 to allow the creation of springing, as
97. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 122 (1957);.Bos, The Durable Power
of Attorney, 64 MICH. B.J. 690, 691 (1985); Note, supra note 96, at 1014. An attorney-in-
fact is not supervised by courts or other authority, but only by the principal. See, e.g.,
SYSTEiMs APPROACH, supra note 94, at 79-80. Decisions of several courts have limited the
effect of disability on the agent's authority under a nondurable power of attorney. They
held that unless it is known "from the outset" that the principal's disability is perma-
nent, contracts entered into by the agent while the principal is disabled are not void, but
voidable at the option of the principal or his authorized representative. United States v.
Manny, 645 F.2d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 1981); Campbell v. United States, 657 F.2d 1174 (Ct.
Cl. 1981); United States v. Price, 514 F. Supp. 477 (S.D. Iowa 1981); Bankers Trust Co.
v. Martin, 51 A.D.2d 411, 381 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1976). The decisions draw an analogy to
the rule that contracts and other acts of incompetents are voidable rather than void.
Price, 514 F. Supp. at 480; Manny, 645 F.2d at 167-68. The courts refused to read stat-
utes authorizing durable powers of attorney as requiring that noncomplying powers of
attorney terminate automatically upon the principal's disability. Price, 514 F. Supp. at
480-81 (applying Iowa law); Campbell, 657 F.2d at 1177-78 (applying Texas law). But see
Jorrie & Standley, The Tax Advantages of Lingering Death, 48 TEx. B.J. 1070, 1077 n.5
(1985) (suggesting that the Campbell case "should not be totally relied upon" as a state-
ment of Texas law concerning the effect of powers of attorney during disability). Some of
the decisions are limited expressly to situations in which no committee or conservator
had been appointed for the principal. Manny, 645 F.2d at 166; Campbell, 657 F.2d at
1176. Moreover, they do not deal with situations of long-term disability or with noncon-
tractual decisions by the agent, and extension to these areas seems unlikely because of
the principal's inability to exercise meaningful control over the agent and questions con-
cerning the principal's intent to delegate such broad discretion to the agent. There are
no South Carolina cases discussing these issues.
98. Collin, Planning and Drafting Durable Powers of Attorney, 15 Prob. Notes 27
(1989).
99. SysTEMs APPROACH, supra note 94, at 10.
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well as immediately effective, durable powers of attorney. 100
Until 1990 South Carolina's statute authorizing the creation of du-
rable powers of attorney contained several features that raised ques-
tions about the validity and utility of a durable power of attorney for
health care. The statute did not limit the types of decisions that the
attorney-in-fact could be authorized to make. Certain aspects of the
statute, however, suggested that the durable power could delegate only
decisions concerning asset management. For instance, the statutes gov-
erning durable powers and conservatorship were integrated, while no
similar integration existed in relation to guardianship. 101 This sug-
gested that the scope of the durable power was limited to the type of
decision that could be made by a conservator. The powers of a conser-
vator relate to asset management, 02 while the powers of a guardian
relate to the person of the ward, including the authority to consent to
health care provided to the ward.
10 3
The 1990 amendments eliminate any doubt whether a durable
power of attorney can be used to delegate authority to make health
care decisioni by expressly stating, "The authority of the attorney-in-
fact to act on behalf of the principal. . . may relate to any act, power,
duty, right, or obligation which the principal has or may acquire...,
including the power to consent or withhold consent on behalf of the
principal to health care."'0 4 The amendments also created linkages be-
tween durable powers and guardianship similar to those that already
existed with conservatorship.
105
The 1990 amendments made several other changes that increased
the utility of durable powers of attorney in the health care setting. For
example, the authorization of the springing durable power of attorney
makes the instrument suitable for people who want to retain control of
their health care until they no longer have legal capacity to do so. Re-
moval of the recording requirement for durable powers of attorney that
100. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-501 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
101. For example, the prior durable power statute stated that the "appointment of
an attorney in fact under this section shall not prevent a person or his representative
from applying to the court and having a conservator appointed, after which the power of
attorney shall become inoperative." Id. § 62-5-501(b) (Law. Co-op. 1987). No similar pro-
vision regarding appointment of a guardian existed. Similarly, an attorney-in-fact was
given priority in the appointment of a conservator, id. § 62-5-410(a)(3), but was not men-
tioned in the provision that governed the appointment of a guardian, see id. § 62-5-311.
102. See id. § 62-5-424 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1990).
103. See id. § 62-5-312 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
104. Id. § 62-5-501(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). Similarly, the Adult Health Care
Consent Act, id. §§ 44-66-10 to -80, also enacted in 1990, includes an appropriately au-
thorized attorney-in-fact among its list of persons who may make health care decisions
for a patient who is unable to make decisions on his own behalf. Id. § 44-66-30(A)(2).
105. Id. § 62-5-501(B).
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relate solely to the person 06 protects the privacy of what is often, in
the health care context, a very private document. Other changes, such
as the inclusion of the attorney-in-fact among those having priority for
appointment as guardian 07 and the principal's authorization to direct
that the power of attorney survive the appointment of a guardian,108
solidify the principal's control over the identity of the person who will
make health care decisions on his behalf. Present South Carolina law,
therefore, makes the durable power of attorney a very useful instru-
ment in planning for future health care.
A. Effect of a Durable Power of Attorney on Health Care Decision
Making
A durable power of attorney, when in effect, places the attorney-
in-fact in the shoes of the principal with authority to make decisions
on the principal's behalf.100 Health care providers are bound to honor
these decisions as if they were decisions of the principal himself.110 The
minimal evidence on this subject indicates that providers do honor the
decisions of persons who hold powers of attorney. Indeed, providers
may not be sufficiently discriminating when determining whether the
attorney-in-fact actually has been delegated power of the type he or
she seeks to exercise.
1 1
1. Determining Whether the Durable Power of Attorney is
Effective
Some persons may wish to make a durable power of attorney for
health care immediately effective, so that the attorney-in-fact can
make health care decisions even when the principal is competent. Of
106. Id. § 62-5-501(C).
107. Id. § 62-5-311(B)(2).
108. See id. § 62-5-501(B).
109. See, eg., id. § 62-2-501(A).
110. Id.
111. The South Carolina Bar conducted a survey of South Carolina hospitals and
nursing homes which revealed a willingness to recognize the authority of persons holding
a power of attorney from the patient, although no distinction seemed to be drawn be-
tween powers of attorney and durable powers of attorney. See Survey Summary of Hos-
pitals, Emergency Rooms and Nursing Homes (on file in the office of the South Carolina
Bar) (summarizing results of survey conducted in 1989 by South Carolina Bar and South
Carolina Commission on Aging). The author's discussions with providers indicate that
neither this distinction nor the distinction between durable powers for health care and
those for asset management are well understood. This problem emphasizes the impor-
tance of prominently stating and labeling any limitations on the powers of the attorney-
in-fact.
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course, the competent principal can revoke the durable power or other-
wise reassert control over his health care at any time simply by inform-
ing the physician. As a practical matter, a physician will not act con-
trary to the wishes of a competent patient who tells the physician that
he wishes to make decisions concerning his own care or who consents
to or refuses treatment on his own behalf. Nor is it likely that the at-
torney-in-fact will seek to assert decision-making authority while the
principal is clearly competent. Nonetheless, the physician and the at-
torney-in-fact have legal authority to bypass the principal if they are
so inclined. It is not unforeseeable that they might choose to do so if
the principal is seriously ill or debilitated, or is difficult to communi-
cate with, or cantankerous.
Most principals tend to prefer a "springing" durable power that
does not become .effective until the principal is incompetent to make
decisions on his own behalf. A primary problem with a springing power
has been the inability of parties dealing with the attorney-in-fact to
determine whether the power is effective, because effectiveness is de-
pendent upon the principal's incompetence. This should not be a sig-
nificant problem in the health-care setting, since the party with whom
the attorney-in-fact is dealing is the principal's physician. Tradition-
ally, it has been the role of physicians to determine whether a patient
is incompetent to make decisions concerning his care.
Under South Carolina's Adult Health Care Consent Act such de-
terminations must be made by two physicians who have personally ex-
amined the patient and noted in the medical record the cause, nature,
extent, and probable duration of the patient's incompetence. 112 Be-
cause the principal will be in a health-care setting at the time that the
determination of incompetence needs to be made, the statutory system
generally will provide a trustworthy and efficient mechanism for mak-
ing this determination. In addition, the Adult Health Care Consent Act
immunizes the attorney-in-fact for making health care decisions in
good faith11s and immunizes the physician for relying in good faith on
those decisions.114 Conformity with the Act thus protects the partici-
pants in making and implementing decisions, thereby helping to ensure
their participation.
The Adult Health Care Consent Act does not, however, limit the
scope of a durable power of attorney for health care. The instrument
may specify conditions of effectiveness and methods to determine
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-20(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
113. Id. § 44-66-70(A). The Act also provides that a person consenting to health care
pursuant to its provisions "does not by virtue of that consent become liable for the costs
of the care. ... Id. § 44-66-70(B).
114. Id. § 44-66-70(C).
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whether those conditions have been satisfied. Those provisions of the
durable power may deviate from the substantive and procedural stan-
dards of the Act.
2. Physician's Duty to Honor the Durable Power of Attorney
If the substantive and procedural standards for determining effec-
tiveness have been satisfied, health care providers have a legal duty to
honor the durable power of attorney and, hence, to honor the decisions
of the attorney-in-fact as if the patient made them himself. 115 Conse-
quently, a legal duty to honor a refusal of treatment by the attorney-
in-fact arises from the law of battery, which prohibits the provision of
most health care without consent from an authorized person. 1" A duty
to honor a consent from an attorney-in-fact arises from the law of neg-
ligence; the failure to provide medically indicated care when an author-
ized person has consented thereto ordinarily violates professional stan-
dards and hence constitutes a breach of the provider's duty of care.
11
7
The physician's duty to honor the decisions of the attorney-in-fact
as if they were the principal's decisions does not require the physician
to honor a decision of an attorney-in-fact in all situations. In some cir-
cumstances a physician may refuse to carry out a patient's own deci-
sion or may petition a court to override it. These same options are
open to the physician in dealing with an attorney-in-fact. A physician
who is uncomfortable performing a procedure requested by a patient or
his representative may refuse to do so unless his refusal would amount
to either negligence or abandonment"" of the patient. On the other
hand, if a physician questions a refusal of treatment by a patient or his
representative, he is not free to impose the unwanted treatment on the
patient, but may petition the probate court to override the refusal. It is
in this fashion that many of the cases involving refusal of life-sus-
115. See id. § 44-66-30(A).
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 comment, illustration 1 (1965); 1 F.
HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 3.10, at 305 & n.32 (2d ed. 1986)
[hereinafter HARPER, JAMES, & GRAY].
117. See 3 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 116, § 17.3.
118. Once a provider-patient relationship is established, it may
be terminated only by the cessation of the necessity which gave rise to the
relationship, or by the discharge of the physician by the patient, or by the
withdrawal from the case by the physician after giving the patient reasonable
notice so as to enable the patient to secure other medical attention.
Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 314, 64 P.2d 208, 211-12 (1937). A physician's termination
of the relationship under other circumstances is considered an abandonment of the pa-
tient, and violates both legal and ethical duties. See Annas, Not Saints, But Healers:
The Legal Duties of Health Care Professionals in the AIDS Epidemic, 78 Am. J. PUB.
HEALTH 844, 845 (1988).
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taining treatment have made their way into the judicial system. The
probate court normally will base its decision on a balancing of the pa-
tient's interest in nontreatment and autonomy against any asserted in-
terests in mandating treatment. In the Death With Dignity Act this
balancing of interests occurred at the legislative level, and hence the
courts have no authority to override the declarant's instructions.11 9
The durable power of attorney statute and the Adult Health Care Con-
sent Act, however, are broader, more general statutes, which do not
represent a specific legislative weighing of the interests in life-sus-
taining procedures. Therefore, the court retains the authority to per-
form this weighing and to override the surrogate's decision if the
state's interest in treatment is found to predominate. Nevertheless, the
enactment of these statutes evidences a legislative preference for pri-
vate decision making, which suggests that courts should be conserva-
tive in substituting their own authority for the decisions made by pa-
tients or their authorized representatives.
B. Discretion of the Attorney-in-Fact
The durable power of attorney statute is an enabling act. It does
not establish the scope of the agent's authority, but leaves it to the
individual principal to define in the instrument the extent of the au-
thority delegated to the agent. Thus, the effect of the instrument on
health care is determined primarily by the terms of the durable power
itself and the nature of the decisions made by the attorney-in-fact.
Effectuation of the principal's intent thus requires that the au-
thority of the attorney-in-fact be carefully defined in the instrument.
Among the matters that should be considered are (1) specifying the
areas within which the agent is authorized to act, (2) establishing a
standard for decision making by the agent, and (3) giving specific in-
structions to the agent.
The definition of the agent's authority should be considered from
two perspectives. First, the principal may wish to limit the areas in
which the agent is authorized to make health care decisions. For in-
stance, a principal might wish to withhold authority to make decisions
concerning the principal's reproductive capacity or commitment to a
mental health treatment facility or other long-term care facility. A
principal may wish to authorize one agent to make decisions concern-
ing only life-sustaining procedures and another agent to make all other
health care decisions. Any such limitations should be clearly and prom-
inently set forth in the instrument.
Second, it may be useful to clearly state areas in which the princi-
119. See infra text accompanying notes 136-37.
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pal intends the agent to have authority, if there might be any question
whether a general authority to make health care decisions includes
those areas. The authority to make decisions concerning life-sustaining
treatment is itself such an area, and should be expressly delegated in
the instrument. 120 This is particularly true in regard to the use of arti-
ficial nutrition and hydration. Other controversial forms of health care,
such as sterilization, abortion, psychosurgery, and electroconvulsive
therapy, should be expressly mentioned if they are to be within the
agent's authority.
The standard upon which the agent's decisions are to be based
also should be specified.. Two general standards are used to guide sur-
rogates in making health care decisions. One of these, the substituted
judgment standard, requires the surrogate to base his decision on what
he believes the patient would have desired under the circumstances. 121
Courts have recently given three quite different interpretations to the
substituted judgment doctrine. One interpretation holds that the doc-
trine goes no further than to allow the surrogate to decide in accor-
dance with the known wishes of the patient.22 A second interpretation
regards a decision in accordance with the patient's known wishes as
not involving substituted judgment, apparently on the theory that this
is merely an implementation of the patient's own judgment. Courts
that take this view regard substituted judgment as a determination by
a surrogate based on the values, perceptions, and perhaps the inconclu-
120. In In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987), for instance, the court stated,
"It would have been better if Ms. Peter had specifically provided in her power of attor-
ney that Mr. Johanning had authority to terminate life-sustaining treatment." Id. at 379,
529 A.2d at 426. The court was willing to recognize such authority because of testimony
from the attorney-in-fact that he was directed orally by the principal to refuse life-sus-
taining treatment, and from nine other witnesses attesting to statements by the principal
that she did not wish to receive such treatment. Id.
121. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1249-51 (D.C. 1990); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 751-53, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-31
(1977); In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 414, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (1987). The substituted judg-
ment standard appears to have originated in a case concerning the appropriateness of a
guardian's providing an allowance to a third party from the estate of an incompetent
ward when the guardian was convinced that the ward would have done so had he been
competent. Ex parte Whitbread in In re Hinde, a Lunatic, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816). The
concept was further developed in Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 751-53, 370 N.E.2d at 430-31.
The Saikewicz court explained the substituted judgment doctrine as follows:
[T]he decision in cases such as this should be that which would be made by the
incompetent person, if that person were competent, but taking into account
the present and future incompetency of the individual as one of the factors
which would necessarily enter into the decision-making process of the compe-
tent person.
Id. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
122. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 221-22, 741 P.2d 674, 688-89 (1987).
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sive statements of the patient. 123 A third interpretation treats both
known wishes and inferred wishes as within the substituted judgment
standard.124
The other standard is the best interests standard, which tradition-
ally has guided the decisions of guardians.1 25 Under this standard, the
provision of medical care to extend a person's life generally has been
presumed to be in the person's best interests.12 Some courts still ac-
cord this presumption conclusive weight in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence that the patient considered nontreatment to be in
his best interests. 27 Other jurisdictions, however, have recognized that
in certain circumstances a third party, such as a guardian or family
member, may determine that nontreatment is in the patient's best in-
terests.2 s The idea that nontreatment may be in the best interests of
an irreversibly unconscious patient is supported by the President's
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research.
12 9
123. See In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 949-50 (Me. 1987); In re Westchester County
Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 530, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 892 (1988).
124. See Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 138-40, 482
A.2d 713, 720-21 (Super. Ct. 1984); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417,
427-28, 497 N.E.2d 626, 631-32 (1986); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 360-63, 486 A.2d 1209,
1229-30 (1985).
125. See, e.g., Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 220-22, 741 P.2d at 687-89; In re Torres, 357
N.W.2d 332, 337-39 (Minn. 1984).
126. See, e.g., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 380-82, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72-74, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, 274-76, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
127. E.g., In re Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), certified
question approved in, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 425
(Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990); Westchester County, 72 N.Y.2d at 530-31, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at
892.
128. See, e.g., In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 212-14, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 857-
58 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988); Torres, 357 N.W.2d at 338-39. In re
Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 814-16, 689 P.2d 1372, 1375-76 (1984).
129. The President's Commission gives the following discussion of the issue:
The primary basis for medical treatment of patients is the prospect that
each individual's interests (specifically, the interest in well-being) will be pro-
moted. Thus, treatment ordinarily aims to benefit a patient through preserving
life, relieving pain and suffering, protecting against disability, and returning
maximally effective functioning. If a prognosis of permanent unconsciousness
is correct, however, continued treatment cannot confer such benefits. Pain and
suffering are absent, as are joy, satisfaction, and pleasure. Disability is total
and no return to an even minimal level of social or human functioning is
possible.
Any value to the patient from continued care and maintenance under such
circumstances would seem to reside in the very small probability that the prog-
nosis of permanence is incorrect. Although therapy might appear to be in the
patient's interest because it preserves the remote chance of recovery of con-
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The New Jersey Supreme Court, in In re Conroy,130 recognized
that the best interests of a conscious patient could be served by non-
treatment when the patient suffers from unavoidable severe pain that
is greater than the pain that would result from nontreatment and that
outweighs the pleasures and satisfactions that the patient derives from
life.131 Other courts have suggested additional limited situations in
which nontreatment might be in the patient's best interest; the pa-
tients in these cases, however, were in a persistent vegetative state.'32
If the principal does not prescribe a standard, state-created stan-
dards for surrogate decision making will be applied. No South Carolina
case has established such a standard, and the Adult Health Care Con-
sent Act is silent on this issue. Therefore, to avoid the possibility of
litigation and to ensure a standard acceptable to the principal, a dura-
ble power should specify and define the desired standard of decision
making. The principal can provide further guidance to the agent by
enunciating in the instrument the values and beliefs that he wishes to
inform the agent's decision making. The principal might state, for in-
stance, that it is important to him to experience a comfortable dying
process, to avoid invasive medical procedures, or to avoid being a bur-
den on his loved ones. Certain values may be identified as being more
important than others. The principal might also state functions the ab-
sence of which would cause him to view the quality of his life as not
worth preserving; these might include physical mobility, the ability to
sciousness, there are two substantial objections to providing vigorous therapy
for permanently unconscious patients.
First, the few patients who have recovered consciousness after a prolonged
period of unconsciousness were severely disabled. The degree of permanent
damage varied but commonly included inability to speak or see, permanent
distortion of the limbs, and paralysis. Being returned to such a state would be
regarded as of very limited benefit by most patients; it may even be considered
harmful if a particular patient would have refused treatments expected to pro-
duce this outcome. Thus, even the extremely small likelihood of "recovery"
cannot be equated with returning to a normal or relatively well functioning
state. Second, long-term treatment commonly imposes severe financial and
emotional burdens on a patient's family, people whose welfare most patients
before they lost consciousness, placed a high value on. For both these reasons,
then, continued treatment beyond a minimal level will often not serve the in-
terests of permanently unconscious patients optimally.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND Bi-
OMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
181-83 (1983), quoted in Torres, 357 N.W.2d at 338-39.
130. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
131. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
132. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 222, 741 P.2d 674, 689 (1987);
Drabick, 20 Cal. App. 3d at 195-97, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 846. Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d at 815,
689 P.2d at 1375-76.
[Vol. 42
36
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss3/2
LVING WILLS AND DURABLE POWERS
recognize and interact with family members, or the ability to experi-
ence a significant level of pleasure.1 3
In areas in which the principal does not wish the agent to exercise
discretion, but only to enunciate and effectuate a decision already
made by the principal, specific instructions may be given to the agent.
For instance, the agent may be instructed to refuse the administration
of nutrition and hydration if the principal is in a persistent vegetative
state. Because the agent lacks authority to act contrary to the instruc-
tion, providers may not rely upon any decision of the agent contrary to
the instruction.
The principal must determine the extent to which he wants the
agent's authority to be defined by areas of authority, standards of deci-
sion making, or instructions. Any limitation placed on the agent's dis-
cretion should be clearly stated and prominently identified in the in-
strument. Most interactions between an attorney-in-fact and those
responsible for implementing his decisions will take place in a health
care, rather than a judicial, setting. Indeed, those using a durable
power of attorney for health care desire to avoid judicial proceedings.
Many health care providers do not understand the potential for diver-
sity among durable powers of attorney, and they are likely to broadly
construe the authority of the attorney-in-fact unless the instrument
prominently identifies limitations on that authority.
134
C. Proposed Statutory Form Health Care Power of Attorney
The flexible nature of the durable power of attorney is itself a
drawback in some ways. The statute is drawn in general terms to en-
able the durable power to be used in a variety of asset management
and personal care situations.135 As a result, the statute does not contain
corollary provisions such as those in the Death With Dignity Act,
138
which are aimed at assuring that the patient's wishes will be carried
out without resort to the courts.137 Among these provisions are the ex-
plicit legal sanction for withholding or withdrawing treatment in cer-
tain circumstances, the creation of a provider's duty to honor the pa-
tient's stated intent, and the immunization of providers from liability
for doing so. A legal duty to honor a decision of the attorney-in-fact
133. See generally Doukas, Lipson, & McCullough, Value History, in CLINICAL As-
PECTS OF AGING 615-16 (1978).
134. Indeed, when a durable power of attorney does not delegate authority over
health care decisions, that fact should prominently appear in the instrument to avoid
mistaken reliance by health care professionals.
135. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-501 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
136. Id. §§ 44-77-10 to -160, as amended by R. 220, H. 3090 (1991).
137. See id.
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can be grounded in common-law principles of battery and negli-
gence. 138 Moreover, appropriate language in the durable power can give
providers some security against liability for honoring the decisions of
the attorney-in-fact. Even a well-drafted instrument, however, cannot
provide the degree of certainty offered by the Death With Dignity Act.
The Act, for instance, clearly establishes the extent of the provider's
duty to determine the validity of the instrument. 13 9 Most importantly,
the Act establishes that no state policy will stand in the way of the
withholding or withdrawal of treatment under the stated circum-
stances.140 A patient's empowerment of a third party to determine that
treatment should be withheld does not bind the state, and much of the
litigation concerning nontreatment has involved the issue of whether
the state will allow a duly empowered guardian or other surrogate to
refuse life-sustaining treatment.' 1 As a legal matter, therefore, one
who executes a durable power authorizing an agent to refuse life-sus-
taining treatment has less certainty of the consequences of his act than
one who executes a Declaration.
To address these areas of uncertainty, as well as other issues, legis-
lation was introduced in the 1991-1992 session of the South Carolina
General Assembly to create a statutory form Health Care Power of At-
torney and define its effect. 42 A statutory form makes the durable
power of attorney accessible to a much wider segment of the public
because it can be executed without the assistance of an attorney. Fur-
thermore, it enables attorneys who are not experts in drafting durable
powers of attorney to prepare these documents for clients with the as-
surance that the document will contain key provisions. Because a stat-
utory form would be used by the majority of persons who execute a
durable power of attorney for health care, providers would become fa-
miliar with the form and have a better understanding of their legal
duties when presented with it.
The form in the proposed statute balances these objectives against
the planning flexibility that is a primary objective in using a durable
power of attorney rather than a Declaration. It attempts to provide
some degree of flexibility without making execution of the document so
138. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
139. See S.C. CODE ANN, §§ 44-77-30 to -40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), as amended
by R. 220, H. 3090 (1991). It also provides a legally authoritative statement that provid-
ers will not be liable for certain acts or omissions. Id. § 44-77-90.
140. See id. § 44-77-30.
141. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985); In re Quinlan, 70
N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1977).
142. A number of other states have enacted statutes that designate the form of the
durable power. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 2500 (West Supp. 1991); Nav. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 449.830 (Michie Supp. 1989); Wis, STAT. ANN. § 155.30 (West Supp. 1990).
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complex that it would thwart the objective of accessibility to a wide
segment of the public. The principal is given the choice of three alter-
native statements concerning life-sustaining procedures, or, if none of
these satisfactorily expresses his wishes, space is provided for instruc-
tions or guidelines in his own words. In addition, the principal may
choose from two alternative statements concerning nutrition and hy-
dration, and may indicate whether or not he wishes the agent to have
authority to consent to donations of organs or tissue for transplanta-
tion. Finally, space is provided for the principal to state any further
limitations on the agent's authority.
The proposed statutory form is adapted from a form developed by
the American Bar Association and the American Association of Retired
Persons. 143 It creates a "springing" durable power of attorney, effective
only at times when the principal is incompetent. The agent is given
broad general authority to make all health care decisions on behalf of
the principal at such times, as well as corollary powers necessary to
effectuate those decisions. These powers may be limited by the princi-
pal as indicated above.
The statutory framework is in many ways similar to the Death
With Dignity Act. It imposes on health care providers a legal duty to
honor the decisions of the agent to the same extent as if they were
made by the principal, and it immunizes them from liability for doing
so. It also immunizes the agent acting in good faith from liability based
on the substance of his decisions. In addition, the bill contains a num-
ber of protective features adapted from the Death With Dignity Act,
including the limitations on who may serve as a witness, the disallow-
ance of mercy killing, and penalties for coercive behavior in obtaining
execution of the instrument.
Enactment of this bill would significantly improve South Carolini-
ans' options for health care planning, and increase the likelihood that
the decisions of an attorney-in-fact would be honored without resort to
the courts. In the absence of legislation of this sort, attorneys must
carefully draft durable powers of attorney to achieve the principal's
objectives concerning care and lessen the likelihood of medical or judi-
cial obstacles to the agent's exercise of the intended authority.
143. A modified version of the proposed statutory form, suitable for use pending
enactment of a statute, is contained in Appendix A to this Article.
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V. EXECUTION OF A HEALTH PLANNING INSTRUMENT: CAPACITY TO
EXECUTE
A. Declaration
A Declaration may be executed only by a person who is eighteen
years old or older.144 Because this age limit is set forth in the statute,
there is no flexibility for inclusion of the mature minor.
The statutory requirements for execution of a Declaration do not
explicitly require that the declarant be competent. General principles
of law, however, disallow the execution of important documents by in-
competent persons, 145 and the legislature demonstrated its intent to
apply these principles to Declarations by requiring that witnesses at-
test to the declarant's "sound mind.
'"1
Competence typically is measured by the capacity of the individ-
ual to understand and make decisions concerning the transaction at
hand.147 Thus, a person who is incompetent to manage his financial
affairs is not necessarily incompetent to execute a Declaration. A per-
son for whom a guardian has been appointed, however, lacks the legal
capacity to act in areas that are subject to the guardianship, even if he
has a lucid interval, regains his reason, or otherwise appears to have
sufficient understanding of the matter at hand to make a reasoned
decision.1
48
B. Nonstatutory Instructions
In the absence of specific rules to govern the competence of a per-
son who executes a nonstatutory living will, it is reasonable to adapt
the rules governing competence to execute a statutory Declaration or
other legal document and rules governing competence to make deci-
sions concerning health care. The general principle that bars execution
of legal documents'4 and medical decision making 50 by a person who
144. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
145. See sources cited infra notes 147-51.
146. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990) (witness affidavit
form).
147. See, e.g., In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 180-81, 372 A.2d 360, 367 (Ch. Div.
1977) (This case defines competence to consent to health care in terms of whether the
patient has "sufficient mind to reasonably understand the condition, the nature and ef-
fect of the proposed treatment, attendant risks in pursuing the treatment, and not pur-
suing the treatment . . ").
148. 2 S, WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNRACTS § 257 (3d ed. 1959).
149. See, e.g., T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 51 (2d ed. 1953); W.
SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 14 (1964).
150. E.g., S. HERR, S. ARONS & R. WALLACE, LEGAL RIGHTS AND MENTAL HEALTH
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is not "of sound mind" surely applies to living wills. As in other con-
texts,151 the "sound mind" criterion should be satisfied by the signa-
tory's capacity to understand the nature and effect of the document
and to make a reasoned decision about whether he should sign.
The law that affects the capacity of minors to make an advance
decision to refuse treatment is inconclusive. The South Carolina Death
With Dignity Act does not allow minors to execute a Declaration.
1 52
The Act expressly preserves, however, "any other legal right... which
any person may have to effect the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining procedures in any lawful manner."15 s3 Other South Carolina
statutes allow certain minors to make decisions that concern their
health care. For example, married minors may consent to health
care.15 4 A minor who is sixteen years old or older may consent to health
care other than "operations."'' 5 Although this statute affirms the ca-
pacity of the mature minor to make certain health care decisions, it
suggests that the finding of capacity does not extend to decisions that
pose a significant net risk to the minor's life or health. The statute
should not be construed, however, to express a clear public policy
against the refusal of life-sustaining treatment by a minor in all cir-
cumstances, as well-being is generally viewed differently when a pa-
tient is in a terminal, permanently unconscious, or other extreme
condition.5 6
CARE 31-32 (1983).
151. See, e.g., Stockmeyer v. Tobin, 139 U.S. 176, 188 (1891) (contractual incapacity
exists when individual is unable to understand the character of the transaction in ques-
tion); Jackson v. Pillsbury, 380 Ill. 554, 561, 44 N.E.2d 537, 546 (1942) (test of mental
capacity is whether a person is capable of understanding the nature and effect of the act
in which the person is engaged); New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Stein, 70 Misc.
2d 944, 946-47, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461, 465 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (individual can be incompetent to
manage his affairs, yet competent to make decisions concerning medical treatment); 2 S.
WILISTON, supra note 148, § 256 (person may be mentally incompetent for some pur-
poses, but not others).
152. See supra text accompanying note 144.
153. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-140 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), as amended by R. 220,
H. 3090 (1991).
154. Id. § 20-7-270 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
155. Id. § 20-7-280. An operation may be performed "only if such is essential to the
health or life of such child . . . ." Id.
156. See, e.g., In re Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), certi-
fied question approved in, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (discontinuance of life-sustaining
treatment inherently justified when patient irreversibly unconscious, but not when pa-
tient experienced a lesser degree of mental limitation); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 374, 529
A.2d 419, 424 (1987) (different standards apply to patient in persistent vegetative state
than to patient who is conscious and capable of limited interaction with environment);
cf. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 211, 741 P.2d 674, 678 (1987) (Rasmussen ap-
pears to recognize a state of existence between life and death to which separate rules can
be applied: "Medical technology has effectively created a twilight zone of suspended ani-
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In In re Swan,157 the Maine Supreme Court held that oral state-
ments made when the patient was sixteen and seventeen years old con-
stituted clear and convincing evidence of his decision to refuse life-
sustaining procedures, and that this decision must be honored. The
court held that the patient's minority at the time of the statements "is
at most a factor to be considered by the factfinder in assessing the
seriousness and deliberativeness with which his declarations were
made."" 8
This case is consistent with the United States Supreme Court de-
cision in Bellotti v. Baird,59 upholding the right of a mature minor to
choose to have an abortion by requiring a state with a parental consent
statute to provide an alternative procedure to allow the minor to
demonstrate her maturity.16 The Court recognized in Bellotti that ma-
ture minors, like adults, have a constitutional right to make certain
important decisions. The maturity requirement in Bellotti, like the
"seriousness and deliberativeness" requirement in Swan, indicates that
the decisive factor in determining whether important decisions by a
minor must be honored is the same as that which determines which
adults are entitled to constitutionally protected decisions: the ability to
understand the nature and effect of the refusal of treatment and to
make a reasoned decision on the matter. 6 '
It is thus likely that a living will executed by a minor will be given
legal effect as an expression of intent if it evidences a mature and care-
fully considered decision. This result is especially likely when the par-
ents of the minor are in accord with the intent expressed in the living
will. In order to facilitate establishment of the minor's maturity and
seriousness of purpose, it is advisable to attach to the instrument affi-
davits from one or more objective adults, such as the minor's minister
or physician, who have discussed the matter with the minor and can
attest to these facts.
Because of the uncertainties that surround the effectiveness of a
living will that is executed by a minor, any such instrument should be
mation where death commences while life, in some form, continues.").
157. 569 A.2d 1202, 1206 (Me. 1990); see also In re E.G., 161 Ill. App. 3d 765, 771-
72, 515 N.E.2d 286, 290-91 af'd in part, reu'd in part, 133 Ill. 2d 98, 549 N.E.2d 322
(1987) (recognizing the right of a mature minor who was a Jehovah's Witness to refuse
transfused blood, a decision in which his parents concurred); In re Long Island Jewish
Medical Center, 147 Misc. 2d 724, 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1990) (suggesting that refusal of
transfusion by nature minor might be honored, but holding that patient was not a ma-
ture minor).
158. Swan, 569 A.2d at 1205 (Me. 1990).
159. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
160. Id. at 643-44.
161. See supra notes 149.51 and accompanying text.
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reviewed by the signatory when he attains the age of eighteen. If no
changes are desired, he can simply re-sign the document and date the
new signature to evidence an adult ratification of his earlier decision.
C. Durable Power of Attorney
As with any legally effective act, a person executing a durable
power of attorney must be competent to understand the nature and
significance of the instrument that he is executing. The statute con-
tains no minimum age requirement for execution of a valid durable
power of attorney, leaving limits to be inferred from analogous sources
of law. South Carolina law allows a person to nominate his own conser-
vator at the age of fourteen, so long as the court believes that he has
sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice. 6 2 Fourteen is
also the age at which a person may nominate his own guardian under
common-law principles. 6 3 A person may make decisions concerning
health care other than surgery at the age of sixteen264 and may make
decisions concerning all forms of health care at any age if he is mar-
ried. 6 5 On the other hand, a person must be eighteen years of age or
married to make a will.' 6 The durable power of attorney statute incor-
porates the requirements for a will only in regard to the formalities of
execution and attestation, and the requirements concerning wit-
nesses. 116 The age at which a person may execute an instrument would
not seem to fall within these categories.
One approach to determining the age at which a person may exe-
cute a durable power of attorney is to apply the age requirements ap-
plicable to the decisions delegated by the durable power of attorney.
This approach is consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Agency,
which states: "A person who has capacity to affect his legal relations by
162. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-410 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
163. See, e.g., J. SCHAULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 445
(4th ed. 1889). The 1990 amendments to the South Carolina Probate Code give a person
nominated by the incapacitated person priority for appointment as guardian. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-5-311(B)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). Prior to the amendment, no statutory
provision allowed a person to nominate his own guardian. Because the amended statute
contains no age limit, it could be construed to adopt the common-law age limit of 14
years or to allow the court to consider age as a factor in rejecting a nominee for good
cause.
164. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-280 (Law. Co-op. 1976). The minor may not consent to
surgery under this provision.
165. Id. § 20-7-270. A minor of any age may also make decisions that concern health
care for a child of the minor. Id. § 20-7-300. These statutes contain no exceptions related
to the type of care.
166. Id. § 62-2-501.
167. See id. § 62-5-501(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
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giving consent to a delegable act or transaction has capacity to author-
ize an agent to do such act or to conduct such transaction for him with
the same effect as if he were to act in person. s1 6 Thus, it should be
possible to execute a durable power of attorney that nominates a con-
servator at the age of fourteen and one that authorizes an agent to
make health care decisions other than surgery at the age of sixteen.169
The agent would have the power to refuse life-sustaining treatment to
the extent that the principal possessed the power.
An alternative approach is to compare the appointment of an at-
torney-in-fact under a durable power of attorney to the designation of
a guardian, as the result of invalidating the durable power on the
grounds of incapacity would be a transfer of decision-making authority
to a guardian or other surrogate. Under this analysis, the criteria for
capacity to appoint a guardian would determine the validity of an ap-
pointment of an attorney-in-fact to make health care decisions. The
validity of instructions to the attorney-in-fact, however, would be de-
termined by the criteria for making decisions of the type embodied in
the instructions.
VI. EXECUTION OF A DECLARATION
A. Form
To invoke the operative provisions of the Death With Dignity
Act,17 0 a Declaration must be "substantially in the form set forth in
Section 44-77-50. ' 1711 The language "substantially in the form" has not
received judicial interpretation. To be on the safe side, however, the
statutory language should be followed as closely as possible and the
typeface requirements set forth in the Act should be precisely adhered
to.17 2 Minor deviations from the statutory language, however, such as
those contained in some forms that have been distributed in the
state, 1  will not likely render the Declaration invalid under the
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 20 (1958).
169. As with a nonstatutory living will, the principal should re-execute the instru-
ment when he attains majority. See supra notes 152-61 and accompanying text.
170. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), as amended by
R. 220, H. 3090 (1991).
171. Id. § 44-77-40.
172. The Code requires the procedure and requirements for revocation of the Decla-
ration to appear either in boldface print or in all upper case letters. In either case, the
characters must be at least the same size as those in the rest of the Declaration. Id. § 44-
77-50.
173. The Society for the Right to Die has distributed a form for use in South Caro-
lina that inserts after the third paragraph of the statutory language a space for "Other
Directions." This insertion, and the inclusion of statements by the declarant in this
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statute.
The Death With Dignity Act was amended in 1988 and 1991, and
the language of the form was changed to reflect the amendments.
1 4
These modifications did not, however, invalidate Declarations executed
under earlier version of the Act. The amendments express the legisla-
ture's intent that Declarations in the 1986 and 1988 forms should re-
main valid.175 Prior versions of the Declaration, however, do not have
the same effect as the 1991 version. The 1986 and 1988 Declarations""
instruct the physician to withhold "life-sustaining procedures" if the
declarant's condition is "terminal," as those terms were defined in the
1986 and 1988 statutes. They do not instruct that artificial nutrition
and hydration be withheld or withdrawn, except where discomfort
would not result from withholding or withdrawal. Nor do they explic-
itly instruct that life-sustaining procedures be withheld if the declarant
is permanently unconscious. If a person wishes his Declaration to have
these effects, he should execute a new Declaration using the 1991
form. 
1 77
space, should not have any effect on the validity of the Declaration under the Act. How-
ever, two cautions are in order. First, any directions that go beyond the scope of the Act
will be treated under the principles that are applied to nonstatutory instructions. See
infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text. The Act does not determine the legal effect of
instructions related to situations that are not included within its language. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-77-140 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), as amended by R. 220, H. 3090 (1991) (no
presumption of intent arises from the absence of a Declaration, and the Act does not
impair other legal rights). Second, if directions set forth in this section of the document
conflict with the statements in the statutory document, the entire Declaration may be
invalid. It would still be possible to have the document examined under the principles
applied to nonstatutory living wills. A basic principle of the law in that area, however, is
a search for the declarant's intent. If the conflict renders intent ambiguous, the docu-
ment would not be given effect as a nonstatutory living will.
A form distributed by the Joint Legislative Committee on Aging under the 1988
version of the Act inserted "(optional)" before the blank for entry of the name of a
designee. Because appointment of a designee is not mandated by the statute, this addi-
tion clearly was insubstantial. See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
174. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) with id. (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1990).
175. See id. § 44-77-20(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), which defines a "declarant" as
"a person who has signed a declaration in accordance with Sections 44-77-40 and 44-77-
50, [or] in accordance with earlier versions of this chapter. . . ." (emphasis added); see
also id. § 44-77-30 (giving effect to a Declaration that "on its face is in compliance with
the law of the state of the declarant's domicile at the time that the declaration is
adopted, if the declaration provided for by the law expresses an intent that is substan-
tially the same as the intent of the declaration provided in Section 44-77-40 . . ").
176. The differences between the 1986 and 1988 Declaration forms are insubstantial.
177. The Act allows a person who has executed a Declaration using one of the ear-
lier forms, or who has executed a similar document in accordance with the law of another
state, to execute a supplementary document providing instructions concerning nutrition
and hydration. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-65 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1990), as amended by R.
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Declarations or similar documents executed in accordance with the
law of another state are to be given the same effect as a South Carolina
Declaration, provided that the statement of intent expressed in the
foreign document calls for results similar to those provided for in the
Act. 1718 Because this provision appears in both the 1988 and 1991 ver-
sions of the Act, foreign documents should be given effect under either
version, depending upon which most closely approximates the intent
stated in the document.
B. Formalities of Execution
The formalities for execution of a Declaration closely resemble
those for the execution of a will.17 9 The similarity is intentional be-
cause these two documents often are executed at the same time. The
declarant must date and sign the Declaration and two witnesses must
sign an affidavit that is included in the Declaration form.180 The docu-
ment must also be notarized. The notary may serve as one of the wit-
nesses, in which case he notarizes only the signature of the other wit-
ness.1sl All parties must sign in each other's presence."'
The Act also sets forth a number of qualifications that witnesses
must meet, and attestations to this effect are included in the affidavit.
The first group of qualifications is aimed at eliminating persons who
might gain financially from the declarant's death. Thus, a witness must
not be closely related to the declarant,83 directly financially responsi-
ble for his medical care, entitled to any portion of his estate under an
220, H. 3090 (1991). This document must be in the form of the "Instructions Concerning
Artificial Nutrition and Hydration" in the Declaration, see id. § 44-77-50, and the execu-
tion formalities are the same as for a Declaration. Id. § 44-77-65.
In most circumstances, however, it would seem preferable to execute a new Declara-
tion rather than supplementing an old one with this codicil-like document. The codicil
would only cover artificial nutrition and hydration, and would not explicitly provide for
withholding or withdrawal of other life-sustaining procedures from permanently uncon-
scious patients. Nor does it allow the declarant to authorize an agent to assure that his
wishes are carried out. Further, as a practical matter, the risk of separation of the two
documents also militates against the codicil approach.
178. Id. §§ 44-77-20(1), -30.
179. Compare id. §§ 44-77.40(2), -50 with id. §§ 62-2-502, -503.
180. Id. §§ 44-77-40(2), -50.
181. Id.
182. Id. §§ 44-77-40(2), (4). Recent amendments to the Probate Code have elimi-
nated this requirement for the execution of wills. See S.C. CODE § 62-2-502 & reporter's
comments.
183. S.C. CODE § 44-77-40(2), as amended by R. 220, H. 3090 (1991) (witness must
not be "related to the declarant by blood, marriage, or adoption, either as a spouse,
lineal ancestor, descendant of the parents of the declarant, or spouse of any of them
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existing will or by intestate succession, a beneficiary of an insurance
policy on his life, or a potential claimant against any portion of his
estate.1 " Another set of qualifications limits the role of health care
providers as witnesses. No more than one witness may be an employee
of a health facility in which the declarant is a patient, and the declar-
ant's attending physician and the physician's employees are barred
from serving as witnesses.1 85 Finally, because persons institutionalized
in a hospital or a nursing care facility often are isolated and depen-
dent, a designee of the State Ombudsman must witness their Declara-
tions to ensure that the Declarations are executed voluntarily. 16
The 1991 form contains several choices that must be made by the
declarant when executing the Declaration. The declarant must give in-
structions concerning nutrition and hydration by initialing the state-
ments that reflect his wishes.'18 If he fails to initial an appropriate
statement, nutrition and hydration will be provided if necessary for the
declarant's comfort.8 8 It should be noted that the "comfort care" op-
tion is different from either of the choices provided on the form, and it
is possible that a declarant would want to deliberately choose this
alternative.
An additional issue to which attention must be given in executing
a Declaration is whether the declarant wishes to authorize an agent to
enforce the Declaration, to revoke it, or to do either. 8 9 If so, the name,
address, and telephone number of the agent or agents must be entered
on the form. 9 0 The declarant does not have to authorize an agent to
perform either function, however, afid the Declaration is valid regard-
less of whether an agent is designated.' 9 '
VII. EXECUTION OF A NONSTATUTORY LIVING WILL
A. Formalities of Execution
The cases do not suggest any particular formalities for the execu-
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. § 44-77-40(3). The emphasis on voluntariness is also evidenced by the stat-
ute's bar on requiring a person to sign a Declaration as a condition for obtaining insur-
ance or medical treatment, or for being admitted to a hospital or nursing home. Id. § 44-
77-120.
187. See id. § 44-77-50.
188. Id. § 44-77-20(2); see supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
189. The declarant may delegate these two areas of authority to different persons.
Id. § 44-77-50.
190. Id.
191. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
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tion of a nonstatutory living will other than date, signature, and some
method for ascertaining the competency of the signatory. In fact, one
can infer from the decided cases that formalities are not crucial to legal
effectiveness. 192 The reason for this is the dilemma faced by parties
who must make a life or death decision that concerns life-sustaining
treatment for an incompetent patient. The patient possesses both a
right to life and a right "to die a natural death without undue depen-
dence on medical technology or unnecessarily protracted agony
... ,,9 Our legal system embodies a preference for prolongation of
life,19 ' but a significant majority of the public has expressed a prefer-
ence for death when the indicia of life have been reduced to a certain
minimum. 95 Faced with the need to make a treatment decision in
these complex situations, the courts have been willing to consider any
expression of intent by the patient, and a recent written expression,
even a relatively informal one, is considered highly probative of the
patient's intent, and hence is given great weight.""6
Despite the leniency of the courts with respect to the form of a
192. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 922,
926 (Fla. 1984) (stating "great weight" should be given to a nonstatutory living will, but
not discussing any specific requirements); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 361 n.5, 486 A.2d
1209, 1229 n.5 (1985) (stating, with no mention of formalities, that a written document is
evidence of patient's intent); In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517,
531-32 & n.4, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613-14 & n.4, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 892-93 & n.4 (1988) (em-
phasizing the need for evidence of patient's "seriousness of purpose" and referring to the
formalities required for an effective will, but stating that "some form of writing" is suffi-
cient evidence in context of treatment refusal); see also cases cited infra note 221 (ac-
cepting even informal oral statements as evidence of intent).
193. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 343, 356, 486 A.2d at 1220, 1227.
194. See, e.g., In re Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 51, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (1990); Ras-
mussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 224, 741 P.2d 674, 691 (1987) (presumption that pa-
tient wants medical treatment); Westchester County, 72 N.Y.2d at 530-31, 531 N.E.2d at
613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892; see also Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419-20 (Mo. 1988),
aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
195. See, e.g., Butler, Ruling May Help Plug Loophole in SC's 'Living Will' Law,
The State, July 1, 1990, at 1-B, col. 1 (New York Times and CBS News poll showed 85%
would want feeding tube removed if they were in a coma); John, To Smoke or Not to
Smoke, Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly Ed., Apr. 20, 1987, at 39, col. 1 (70% of adults surveyed
in Gallup poll would be "very willing" to have life-support devices disconnected); Right
to Die Polls Continue on Upswing, Society for the Right to Die Newsletter, Spring 1985,
at 5, col. 1 (reporting three polls in which large majorities favored withholding or with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment).
196. See, e.g., Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 922-26; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 361-63, 486 A.2d
at 1230; Westchester County, 72 N.Y.2d at 530-31, 531 N.E.2d at 613-14, 534 N.Y.S.2d
at 892-93 (none of these cases expresses concern about the formalities of the writing).
Earlier statements, when considered in conjunction with recent statements, may help to
establish consistency of purpose or to define the specific nature of the patient's intent.
See, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 428-29, 497 N.E.2d 626,
631-32 (1986).
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written expression of intent, one should pay heed to the formalities
required by the Death With Dignity Act when drafting a nonstatutory
living will.197 Although these formalities are not required for the docu-
ment to represent a legally cognizable expression of the signatory's in-
tent, they will demonstrate to the provider, the provider's attorney, the
court, family members, and any other interested party that the signa-
tory was aware of the seriousness and legal implications of his execu-
tion of the document. The formalities also are helpful in establishing
the signatory's voluntariness and his competence. Moreover, to the ex-
tent that the Act's requirement of formalities represents a statement of
public policy about the execution of documents with life or death con-
sequences, compliance with the formalities will eliminate the minimal
risk that implementation of a more informal document might be con-
sidered contrary to public policy.
VIII. EXECUTING A DURABLE POWER OF ATrORNEY
A. Formalities
The South Carolina statute requires that a durable power of attor-
ney be "executed and attested with the same formality and with the
same requirements as to witnesses as a will."19 Those requirements are
that the instrument be in writing,19 that it be signed, and that it be
witnessed by two persons.20 0 Although South Carolina law requires that
a durable power of attorney be recorded to be effective,20 ' this require-
ment does not apply if the instrument relates solely to the person of
the principal.20 2 Thus, a durable power of attorney that delegates au-
thority related only to health care need not be recorded. Additionally,
in 1990 the legislature eliminated the requirement that a durable
197. See supra notes 179-91 and accompanying text.
198. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-501(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
199. The requirement of a writing is also expressed in the statute that authorizes
durable powers of attorney. Id. § 62-5-501(A).
200. Id. § 62-2-502. The signature can be that of the principal or of some other
person who signs in the principal's presence and at his direction. Persons that sign as
witnesses of a will must have witnessed either the signing of the will or the testator's
acknowledgement of the signature or of the will. Id.
201. Id. § 62-5-501(C). If it is to be effective during periods of the principal's disa-
bility, a durable power of attorney that is not related solely to personal matters must be
recorded in the same manner as a deed in the county where the principal resides at the
time of recordation. Id. The statute does not specify when the instrument may be re-
corded and specifically allows for recordation after the onset of the principal's disability.
Id.
202. Id.
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power of attorney be probated.20 3
B. Form
The statute imposes no requirements on the form or content of a
durable power of attorney other than the mandate that certain statu-
tory language "or similar words" appear in the document. The statu-
tory language for creating an immediately effective durable power is as
follows: "This power of attorney is not affected by physical disability
or mental incompetence of the principal which renders the principal
incapable of managing his own estate. '204 Alternative statutory lan-
guage creates a springing durable power: "This power of attorney be-
comes effective upon the physical disability or mental incompetence of
the principal.120 5 It is not necessary to use the precise statutory lan-
guage, which may not adequately express the intention of a particular
principal. The statute was intended to allow substantial flexibility to
those wishing to delegate authority over their affairs. Consequently,
nonstatutory language is acceptable if it shows the intent of the princi-
pal to confer authority that is exercisable notwithstanding his physical
disability or mental incompetence. 20 6 A deviation from the statutory
language that will often be desirable in a health care power of attorney
is removal of physical disability as a circumstance in which the instru-
ment becomes effective. The principal generally will want to retain au-
thority to make health care decisions until he is legally disabled from
doing so by mental incompetence.
C. Drafting Considerations
This Article will not attempt to set out all of the issues that
should be considered in drafting a durable power of attorney.207 There
are, however, several issues relating specifically to the durable power of
attorney for health care that deserve mention.
203. See id.
204. Id. § 62-5-501(A).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Among the other issues that should be addressed in a durable power of attor-
ney for health care are (1) access to medical records, (2) payment for health care, includ-
ing the interaction of the attorney-in-fact with any conservator that might be appointed,
(3) protection of third parties relying on the agent's decisions, and (4) successor attor-
neys-in-fact. For further information on drafting considerations, as well as suggested lan-
guage, see SYSTEMS APPROACH, supra note 94, at 23, 41-48, 74-102, 139-56, 266-75; Collin,
supra note 98, at 51-66.
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1. Choice of Attorney-in-Fact
The draftsman should not automatically include a provision relat-
ing to health care in a durable power of attorney that also concerns an
assortment of other matters. Health care providers may have difficulty
identifying provisions related to health care and defining their scope in
an instrument conferring a variety of powers. In addition, the inclusion
of both personal and asset management authority in the same instru-
ment necessitates that it be recorded.20 8 Furthermore, the principal
may want different persons to make health care decisions and to man-
age his assets. A principal might want a person experienced in asset
management to perform tasks of the latter sort, while desiring that
health care decisions be made by a close family member or friend with
a broad understanding of the principal's values and attitudes. The law
does not bar a person from executing more than one durable power of
attorney empowering different persons to act in different areas.
20 9
Nor does South Carolina law limit who may be appointed as attor-
ney-in-fact under a durable power of attorney. The policies that sup-
port exclusion of close family members and others from serving as wit-
nesses to a Declaration of a Desire for a Natural- Death apply with even
more force to serving as an attorney-in-fact with power to make deci-
sions concerning life-sustaining treatment, because the interested party
is in a position to make a death-causing decision. The potential for a
conflict of interest in this situation, however, is outweighed by the im-
portance of allowing the principal to have highly subjective decisions
concerning health care made by a person with whom he has a close
relationship. A close friend or relative is most likely to be familiar with
the principal's values and attitudes and replicate the decisions the
principal would have made.21 0 Judicial intervention, including appoint-
ment of a guardian, may be initiated if a conflict of interest leads to
abuse of the delegated authority.
21
208. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-501(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). Similarly, the principal
may not want the provisions of a power of attorney relating to financial matters to be-
come part of his medical record.
209. Indeed, South Carolina statutory law implicitly endorses this concept by divid-
ing protective functions between guardian and conservator, who need not be the same
person. See generally id. §§ 62-5-101 to -435 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1990).
210. When the issue is whether family members can serve as witnesses to a docu-
ment, the policy balance is much different because it is less important that a person
functioning as a witness have a close personal relationship with the person who signs the
document.
211. This possibility should be considered when drafting provisions for termination
of the agency and determining whether to provide that the durable power survives ap-
pointment of a guardian. These concerns should be balanced against the possibility that
judicial intervention might be employed by persons wishing to terminate the authority of
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2. Instructions Regarding Establishment of Principal's
Incompetence
Whenever the powers of an attorney-in-fact depend upon the in-
competence of the principal, the determination of incompetence is an
important issue. Those who are asked to accept the authority of the
attorney-in-fact may be reluctant to do so because they are uncertain
whether the principal actually is incompetent. 21 2 The instrument may
provide a method for determining incompetence, such as certification
by two physicians. Even with such language, however, uncertainties
arise from the possibility that the principal has regained competence
since the physician's certification.
This issue is much less troublesome with respect to health care
than in other contexts. In the health care setting, the person asked to
accept the authority of the attorney-in-fact is a health care provider
who is capable of determining competence. Indeed, providers in this
state have specific statutory authority to determine incompetency as a
basis for accepting health care decisions made by an attorney-in-
fact.21 1 South Carolina's Adult Health Care Consent Act,214 which es-
tablishes the framework for surrogate decision making concerning
health care in South Carolina, requires that incompetence ("inability
to consent") be certified by two licensed physicians who have person-
ally examined the patient.21 5 In addition to certifying "inability to con-
sent," these physicians must state an opinion regarding the cause and
nature of the inability, its extent, and its probable duration.216 This
opinion obviates the need for obtaining recertification for each medical
procedure when the patient's incompetence is expected to be of ex-
tended duration. Recertification should be necessary only if the pa-
tient's mental capabilities have changed.
The Adult Health Care Consent Act does not purport to limit the
flexibility of persons who execute durable powers of attorney for health
an attorney-in-fact who is acting consistently with the principal's wishes. Much of the
uncertainty in this choice can be eliminated by including in the instrument appropriate
instructions to the attorney-in-fact as to how his authority is to be exercised.
212. See SYSTEMS APPROACH, supra note 94, at 94-95; Bos, supra note 97, at 696.
213. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-20(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
214. Id. §§ 44-66-10 to -80.
215. Id. § 44-66-20(6). A certification of inability to consent shifts the authority to
make health care decisions from the patient to a surrogate. The Act establishes priority
among surrogates. An attorney-in-fact with authority to make health care decisions is
second in priority, following a court-appointed guardian. Id.
In emergencies, when the delay in obtaining certification from two physicians would
jeopardize the patient's health, the health care professional primarily responsible for the
patient's care may certify that the principal is unable to consent. Id.
216. Id.
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care. The Act instead establishes a decision-making framework for per-
sons who meet statutorily defined criteria for incompetence, and recog-
nizes the authority of an attorney-in-fact within that framework. A du-
rable power of attorney may specify different criteria for
incompetence 217 and different processes for determining when those
criteria are satisfied. It is nonetheless advisable to adhere to the statu-
tory criteria unless good reasons for deviation exist, because these cri-
teria are familiar to health care professionals and consistent with their
customary practices. In addition, these criteria are expeditious and
trustworthy, and should satisfy the needs of most persons executing
durable powers for health care.
3. Effect of Subsequent Appointment of a Guardian
Under the amended durable power of attorney statute, the ap-
pointment of a guardian terminates any part of a power of attorney
that relates to matters within the scope of the guardianship, unless the
power of attorney provides otherwise.218 The objective of this provision
presumably is to prevent two different persons from holding the same
power. It can be inferred, therefore, that if the power of attorney pro-
vides that it shall not be terminated by the appointment of a guardian,
the guardian's powers will not include the powers reserved to the attor-
ney-in-fact.
Because an attorney-in-fact under a durable power of attorney for
health care would have priority for appointment as guardian unless the
principal designated someone else,219 one might question whether any
reason exists to specify that the durable power of attorney survive ap-
pointment of a guardian. Because the probate court is allowed to devi-
ate from the statutory priorities upon a finding of good cause, it is pos-
sible that the attorney-in-fact will be bypassed, even if he has been
specifically nominated as guardian by the principal. This might occur,
for instance, if a principal nominated someone other than an immedi-
ate family member to serve as attorney-in-fact because of concern that
immediate family members did not understand or agree with the prin-
cipal's wishes concerning his future health care. In this circumstance
the court might determine that a close family member was a more ap-
propriate person to have the range of powers associated with guardian-
217. A durable power of attorney also may be made effective in times when the
principal is competent.
218. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-501(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
219. Id. § 62-5-311(B). The principal may nominate the attorney-in-fact to serve as
guardian, either in the durable power of attorney or some other document, in which case
the attorney-in-fact would have first priority for appointment. The probate court can
vary the statutory order of priority only upon a finding of good cause. Id.
1991]
53
Patterson: Planning for Health Care Using Living Wills and Durable Powers of
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ship. Indeed, the principal might well agree, while nonetheless desiring
that the attorney-in-fact retain authority over certain aspects of health
care. If it is foreseeable that a court could bypass the attorney-in-fact
for appointment as guardian, the lawyer preparing a durable power of
attorney for health care should explore these issues with the principal
and ensure that the principal's wishes concerning the division of au-
thority between an attorney-in-fact and a guardian are clearly set
forth. This is particularly important when the attorney-in-fact will be
someone other than a close family member.
Another reason the principal may want the durable power of attor-
ney to survive appointment of a guardian is to preserve the effect of
instructions to the attorney-in-fact that are included in the instru-
ment. A guardian's authority derives from the probate court, rather
than from the incapacitated person. Thus, the instructions and autho-
rizations in the durable power of attorney do not constitute limitations
on the authority of the guardian.220 Instructions that evidence the pa-
tient's wishes concerning certain proposed health care, however, would
have the status of nonstatutory instructions and would bind the guard-
ian and third parties.221 Authorizations, such as a statement that the
220. The guardian's authority may be limited by the court. Id. § 62-5-304(C). The
proposed Health Care Power of Attorney statute provides that instructions contained in
a power of attorney executed under the statute are binding on a guardian or other surro-
gate. S. 541 (1991).
221. With one exception, the cases hold that a guardian is bound by the patient's
desires if they are clearly evidenced. See cases cited supra notes 121-24 and accompany-
ing text. The exception is In re Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 210-12, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840,
856-57 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988), in which the court held that a con-
servator has exclusive authority to make a treatment decision based on the conservatee's
best interests and is not bound by the conservatee's prior expressed preferences.
Drabick, however, was grounded on a statute stating, "If the conservatee has been adju-
dicated to lack the capacity to give informed consent for medical treatment, the conser-
vator has the exclusive authority to give consent for such medical treatment to be per-
formed on the conservatee as the conservator in good faith based on medical advice
determines to be necessary and the conservator may require the conservatee to receive
such medical treatment, whether or not the conservatee objects." Id. at 200, 245 Cal.
Rptr. at 849 (citing CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355(a) (West 1981)). South Carolina statutes, in
contrast, bar a guardian from consenting to health care contrary to the known wishes of
the ward. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-66-60(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
Any evidence of the patient's wishes is given consideration in these cases, including
nonspecific oral statements made years before the situation at issue arose. See Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 428-29, 497 N.E.2d 626, 631-32 (1986) (nonspe-
cific statements, some of them made years earlier); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 953 (Me.
1987). Written instructions of the patient are considered highly probative if the writing
is of recent vintage. See authorities cited supra note 196. As written expressions of the
patient's wishes, instructions contained in a durable power of attorney should be given
effect even though the instrument is no longer capable of empowering a particular indi-
vidual to enunciate or enforce those wishes.
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agent has authority to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration, would
not seem to be sufficient evidence of whether or not the patient wanted
to receive the indicated care. They could be construed, however, as evi-
dencing the patient's intent that his surrogate have discretion to deter-
mine whether the patient should receive such care. This is particularly
true if the guardian is a person to whom the durable power of attorney
expressly gave such authority.
IX. REVOCATION
A. Declaration
A Declaration may be revoked through any one of five mecha-
nisms, three of which are also methods for revoking a wi. 222 First, a
Declaration may be revoked by being torn, defaced, or otherwise de-
stroyed.223 So long as this act is pursuant to the declarant's intent to
revoke, it is immaterial whether the act is performed by the declarant
himself or by some other person. If another person performs the act,
however, he must do so in the presence and at the direction of the
declarant. 224 A Declaration may also be revoked by a writing signed
and dated by the declarant, 225 or by the declarant's oral expression.
22
6
No particular language is required as long as the intent to revoke is
clear.227 None of these forms of revocation is effective until communi-
cated to the attending physician.
22
222. A will may be revoked by physical act, by written instrument, or by a subse-
quent inconsistent will. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-506 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
223. Id. § 44-77-80(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), as amended by R. 220, H. 3090
(1991).
224. Id. Destruction of one original revokes any other originals. The attending phy-
sician is entitled, however, to rely upon the validity of an original Declaration until he
receives notice of the revoking act. Id. § 44-77-80(2). See infra notes 227-28 and accom-
panying text.
225. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-80(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990), as amended by R. 220,
H. 3090 (1991).
226. Id. § 44-77-80(3).
227. See id. § 44-77-80(2)-(3). The requirement that intent be clear is given particu-
lar emphasis with oral revocations in order to prevent an ambiguous statement made
during a moment of consciousness from frustrating a declarant's carefully thought out
intent. Thus the Act states: "To be effective as a revocation, the oral expression clearly
must indicate the declarant's desire that the declaration not be given effect or that life-
sustaining procedures be administered. . . ." Id. § 44-77-80(3)(c).
228. See id. § 44-77-80(1)-(4). Furthermore, an oral revocation is ineffective if com-
municated to the attending physician by someone other than the declarant unless three
conditions are met: the communicant must have been present when the declarant ex-
pressed his intent to revoke; the communicant must have communicated the declarant's
statement to the physician within a reasonable time; and the physical or mental condi-
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A Declaration also may be revoked by a person designated by the
declarant in the Declaration. 229 Although a space for designating such a
person is included in the Declaration form, it is not necessary to enter
a name in this space. It is up to the declarant to determine whether he
wishes to give another person power to revoke the Declaration; the
Declaration is valid whether or not he does so. 23 0 If the declarant does
not wish to name an agent with power to revoke, it is advisable to
strike through this space or enter language indicating that no agent is
being named. If an agent is named, his power to revoke exists only if
the declarant is incompetent to do so.231 Finally, a Declaration is re-
voked by execution of a subsequent Declaration.
2
-
2
B. Durable Power of Attorney
A durable power of attorney may be revoked at any time by a
competent principal.2 33 The statute does not specify methods for revo-
cation. As a general rule, an agency can be revoked "by any word or act
of the principal indicating that the agent is no longer to exercise his
authority of which the agent has notice. '234 It is important to assure
that providers who might be asked to honor the durable power are
aware of the revocation. To this end, a revocation should be communi-
cated to the attending physician, family members, and others who are
likely to be present when health care decisions are made.
tion of the declarant must make it impossible for the physician to confirm through sub-
sequent conversation with the declarant that he did in fact express the intent to revoke.
Id. § 44-77-80(3). These limitations on the effectiveness of an oral revocation communi-
cated to the physician by someone other than the declarant are intended to assure the
trustworthine3s of the communicant's statement that the declarant revoked.
229. Id. § 44-77-80(4).
230. See id. § 44-77-50 (describing appointment of agent on Declaration form as
"optional").
231. Id. § 44-77-80(4). The Act does not address the situation in which the declarant
is intermittently competent or may be competent in the future. When a treatment deci-
sion must be made before the declarant regains his competence, the best course of action
probably would be to honor the revocation by the agent. Doing so will result in continua-
tion of the declarant's life, and may give him a subsequent opportunity to state his in-
tentions about the withdrawal of treatment. If he opposes the revocation the overall im-
pact would be a mere delay in effectuating his intent. Conversely, if a revocation with
which he agreed was not honored, the declarant's death would foreclose any opportunity
to express his concurrence.
232. Id. § 44-77-80(5).
233. Bos, supra note 97, at 693.
234. W. SEAVEY, supra note 149, § 46C.
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C. Nonstatutory Instructions
Because nonstatutory instructions are not supported by a detailed
legal framework, there are no specific rules concerning revocation of
these instruments. Any clear and trustworthy evidence of intent to re-
voke, therefore, should be sufficient if it is properly communicated to
the relevant parties.
X. CONCLUSION
Although there is no foolproof way to ensure that one's wishes
concerning future health care will be carried out, South Carolina law
now offers several options that enable a person to have substantial in-
fluence over his future care. Three types of instruments may be used
either separately or in combination to bring about the desired course of
treatment. A Declaration in the form set forth in the South Carolina
Death With Dignity Act instructs providers to withhold life-sustaining
treatment if one is permanently unconscious or suffers from a condi-
tion capable of causing death within a relatively short time. A nonstat-
utory living will may provide additional or alternative instructions to
providers. It does not have the statutory authority of a Declaration,
but is treated as an expression of intent to refuse or demand certain
treatment. As such, it creates common-law duties related to principles
of battery and professional standards of care. It also creates constitu-
tional duties derived from its status as an expression of the liberty in-
terests protected by the Due Process Clauses. A durable power of at-
torney may be used to authorize an agent to determine whether the
principal should receive certain forms of treatment, and to provide in-
structions or guidance to the agent in making those decisions.
Both law and public opinion now solidly support individual auton-
omy in decision making concerning life-sustaining treatment. Legal in-
stitutions have taken important strides in providing mechanisms to fa-
cilitate the exercise of autonomy in this area. Lawyers should fully
explore with their clients the available health planning options, en-
courage clients to discuss with their physicians the medical conditions
that typically necessitate choices concerning life-sustaining care, and,
using the available legal instruments, express their clients' decisions as
clearly and specifically as possible.
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APPENDIX A: FORM HEALTH CARE POWER OF ATTORNEY
The following is a modified version of the form contained in S.541,
which would create a statutory form Health Care Power of Attorney.
The form is modified here to incorporate certain material that is dealt
with in provisions of the proposed statute, but which must be ad-
dressed in the form itself if used in the absence of a statute. The pro-
posed statutory form was based on a form prepared by the American
Bar Association and the American Association of Retired Persons.
HEALTH CARE POWER OF ATTORNEY
1. DESIGNATION OF HEALTH CARE AGENT
I, , hereby appoint:
(Principal)
(Attorney-in-fact's name)
(Address)
Home Telephone: Work Telephone:
as my attorney-in-fact (or Agent) to make health and personal
care decisions for me as authorized in this document.
2. EFFECTIVE DATE AND DURABILITY
By this document I intend to create a durable power of attorney
effective upon, and only during, any period of mental
incompetence. Mental incompetence is to be determined
according to the standards and procedures for "inability to
consent" set forth in the Adult Health Care Consent Act, S.C.
Code § 44-66-20(6), except that certification of mental
incompentence by my Agent may be substituted for certification
by a second physician.
3. AGENT'S POWERS
I grant to my Agent full authority to make decisions for me
regarding my health care. In exercising this authority, my Agent
shall follow my desires as stated in this document or otherwise
expressed by me or known to my Agent. In making any decision,
my Agent shall attempt to discuss the proposed decision with me
to determine my desires if I am able to communicate in any way.
If my Agent cannot determine the choice I would want made,
then my Agent shall make a choice for me based upon what my
Agent believes to be in my best interests. My Agent's authority to
interpret my desires is intended to be as broad as possible, except
for any limitations I may state below.
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Accordingly, unless specifically limited by Section H below,
my Agent is authorized as follows:
A. To consent, refuse, or withdraw consent to any and all types
of medical care, treatment, surgical procedures, diagnostic
procedures, medication, and the use of mechanical or other
procedures that affect any bodily function, including, but not
limited to, artificial respiration, nutritional support and
hydration, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation;
B. To authorize, or refuse to authorize, any medication or
procedure intended to relieve pain, even though such use
may lead to physical damage, addiction, or hasten the
moment of, but not intentionally cause, my death;
C. To authorize my admission to or discharge, even against
medical advice, from any hospital, nursing care facility, or
similar facility or service;
D. To take any other action necessary to making, documenting,
and assuring implementation of decisions concerning my
health care, including, but not limited to, granting any
waiver or release from liability required by any hospital,
physician, or other health care provider; signing any
documents relating to refusals of treatment or the leaving of
a facility against medical advice, and pursuing any legal
action in my name, and at the expense of my estate, to force
compliance with my wishes as determined by my Agent, or to
seek actual or punitive damages for the failure to comply;
E. To have access to medical records and information to the
same extent that I am entitled to, including the right to
disclose the contents to others;
F. To contract on my behalf for placement in a health care or
nursing care facility or for health care related services,
without incurring personal financial liability for the contract;
G. To hire and fire medical, social service, and other support
personnel responsible for my care;
H. The powers granted above do not include the following
powers or are subject to the following rules or limitations:
4. ORGAN DONATION (INITIAL ONLY ONE)
My Agent may -, may not - consent to the donation of all
or any of my tissue or organs for purposes of transplantation.
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5. EFFECT ON DECLARATION OF A DESIRE FOR A
NATURAL DEATH (LIVING WILL)
If I have a valid Declaration of a Desire for a Natural Death, the
instructions contained in the Declaration will be given effect in
any situation to which they are applicable. My Agent will have
authority to make decisions concerning my health care only in
situations to which the Declaration does not apply.
6. STATEMENT OF DESIRES AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS
With respect to any Life-Sustaining Treatment, I direct the
following: (INITIAL ONLY ONE OF THE FOLLOWING FOUR
PARAGRAPHS)
(A).- GRANT OF DISCRETION TO AGENT. I do not want
my life to be prolonged nor do I want life-sustaining treatment to
be provided or continued if my Agent believes the burdens of the
treatment outweigh the expected benefits. I want my Agent to
consider the relief of suffering, my personal beliefs, the expense
involved, and the quality as well as the possible extension of my
life in making decisions concerning life-sustaining treatment.
OR
(B)_ DIRECTIVE TO WITHHOLD OR WITHDRAW
TREATMENT. I do not want my life to be prolonged and I do
not want life-sustaining treatment:
1. if I have a condition that is incurable or irreversible and,
without the administration of life-sustaining procedures,
expected to result in death within a relatively short
period of time; or
2. if I am in a state of permanent unconsciousness.
OR
(C). DIRECTIVE FOR MAXIMUM TREATMENT. I want
my life to be prolonged to the greatest extent possible, within the
standards of accepted medical practice, without regard to my
condition, the chances I have for recovery, or the cost of the
procedures.
OR
(D).- DIRECTIVE IN MY OWN WORDS:
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7. STATEMENT OF DESIRES REGARDING TUBE FEEDING
With respect to Nutrition and Hydration provided by means of a
nasogastric tube or tube into the stomach, intestines, or veins, I
wish to make clear that (INITIAL ONLY ONE)
(A). I do not want to receive these forms of artificial
nutrition and hydration, and they may be withheld or withdrawn
under the conditions given above.
OR
(B).- I do want to receive these forms of artificial nutrition
and hydration.
8. SUCCESSORS
If an Agent named by me dies, becomes legally disabled, resigns,
refuses to act, becomes unavailable, or (if an Agent is my spouse)
is divorced from me or separated from me under the
circumstances stated in S.C. Code § 20-7-473(2), I name the
following as successors to my Agent, each to act alone and
successively, in the order named. The word "Agent" in this
document includes a Successor Agent who has assumed authority
to act pursuant to this section.
A. First Alternate Agent:
Address:
Telephone:
B. Second Alternate Agent:
Address:
Telephone:
9. PROTECTION OF MY AGENT AND THIRD PARTIES
WHO RELY ON MY AGENT
No health care provider or other person or entity that relies in
good faith upon a person's representation that he is the person
named as my Agent or who relies in good faith on a health care
decision made by my Agent shall be liable to me, my estate, my
heirs or assigns, for recognizing the Agent's authority or relying
on the decision.
No Agent who in good faith makes a health care decision
pursuant to the authority granted herein shall be liable to me, my
estate, my heirs or assigns, on account of the substance of the
decision.
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10. ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
A. I revoke any prior Health Care Power of Attorney and any
provisions relating to health care of any other prior power of
attorney.
B. This power of attorney is intended to be valid in any
jurisdiction in which it is presented.
C. My Agent shall not be entitled to compensation for services
performed under this Health Care Power of Attorney, but he
or she shall be entitled to reimbursement for all reasonable
expenses incurred as a result of carrying out the Health Care
Power of Attorney.
D. The powers delegated under this power of attorney are
separable, so that the invalidity of one or more powers shall
not affect any others.
11. UNAVAILABILITY OF AGENT
If at any relevant time the Agent and Successor Agents named
herein are unable or unwilling to make decisions concerning my
health care, and those decisions are to be made by a guardian, by
the Probate Court, or by a surrogate pursuant to the Adult
Health Care Consent Act, it is my intention that the guardian,
Probate Court, or surrogate make those decisions in accordance
with my directions as stated in this document.
BY SIGNING HERE I INDICATE THAT I UNDERSTAND THE
CONTENTS OF THIS DOCUMENT AND THE EFFECT OF THIS
GRANT OF POWERS TO MY AGENT.
I sign my name to this Health Care Power of Attorney on this
day of ,19-. My current home address is:
Signature:
Name:
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WITNESS STATEMENT
I declare, on the basis of information and belief, that the person who
signed or acknowledged this document (the principal) is personally
known to me, that he/she signed or acknowledged this Health Care
Power of Attorney in my presence, and that he/she appears to be of
sound mind and under no duress, fraud, or undue influence.
Witness No. 1
Signature: Date:
Print Name: Telephone:
Residence Address:
Witness No. 2
Signature: Date:
Print Name: Telephone:
Residence Address:
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